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GAMES AND OTHER UNCOPYRIGHTABLE SYSTEMS 
Bruce E. Boyden* 
INTRODUCTION 
Games are deceptively simple objects of human culture.1 They are  
familiar, commonplace, and often easy to learn: young children play them 
at an early age. For most people, games are a pastime, a form of recreation 
that involves relatively little preparation or time commitment.2 They are 
thus the very opposite of work, and hardly comparable to such serious  
pursuits as scholarship or art.3 
For all their seeming ingenuousness, however, games are also deeply 
puzzling. Defining games is a notoriously difficult enterprise.4 Scholars 
from several different disciplines have struggled to determine what the  
nature, or essence, of games really is. And the elusiveness of games poses 
problems for intellectual property law as well. Games seem to straddle the 
boundaries between copyright and patent, between author, performer, and 
reader, and between protected and unprotected material. Games are an  
entertainment medium on par with such copyrightable material as music, 
films, or novels. But games are also comprised of rules and instructions, 
like uncopyrightable recipes and patentable procedures. Games convey an 
experience of play to users, just as music and drama convey an aesthetic or 
narrative experience to viewers and listeners. But the experience of game 
  
 * Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School; B.A., Arkansas; M.A., Northwestern; 
J.D., Yale. I would like to thank Jon Baumgarten, Greg Lastowka, Michael Risch, Rebecca Tushnet, and 
the editors of the George Mason Law Review for their valuable comments on the arguments in this 
Article; William Nesnidal and Jeffrey Mies for their research assistance; and especially Amy Quester for 
all of her help and encouragement. Any errors that remain are inexplicable. 
 1 See generally ELLIOTT M. AVEDON & BRIAN SUTTON-SMITH, THE STUDY OF GAMES (1971); 
ROGER CAILLOIS, MAN, PLAY, AND GAMES (Meyer Barash trans., 1961); JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO 
LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE (Beacon Press 1955) (1949); BRIAN SUTTON-
SMITH, THE AMBIGUITY OF PLAY (1997). 
 2 There are, of course, exceptions: for example, professional chess players, Scrabble tournaments, 
and sports athletes who devote considerable time to honing their performance. But considered as a 
subset of all game play, these exceptions are rare. 
 3 Scholarship about games is thus a bit marginal in the academic world, and there is continual 
debate about whether games, and video games in particular, can qualify as art. See, e.g., CHRIS 
CRAWFORD, THE ART OF COMPUTER GAME DESIGN, at xi (1984); Daniel Radosh, Op-Ed., The Play’s 
the Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/opinion/28radosh.html; 
Jeremy Reimer, Roger Ebert Says Games Will Never Be as Worthy as Movies, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 30, 
2005, 4:30 PM), http://arstechnica .com/old/content/2005/11/5657.ars. 
 4 See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS paras. 66-67 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968). 
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play emerges primarily from the actions and choices of the players, whereas 
the aesthetic experience of music and drama is largely determined by the 
actions and choices of others. 
Games therefore pose a number of challenges for copyright and patent 
law. Yet to date, intellectual property doctrine and scholarship has not real-
ly grappled with the slippery nature of games. Indeed, copyright has devel-
oped a very simple black-letter rule to handle them: games are not copy-
rightable.5 That rule begins to fall apart on close examination, however. It 
turns out that while games per se are not copyrightable, most of their consti-
tuent elements are: the board, pieces, cards, and even the particular expres-
sion of the rules.6 What could be the purpose of such a rule? 
The case law sheds no further light on the problem. The origins of the 
rule against copyright in games are lost in the mists of time; even the earli-
est cases refer to the rule without discussion, as though it were obvious.7 A 
few scholars have more recently attempted to examine this bit of copyright 
lore but have not reached any firm conclusions.8 And the current trend in 
both case law and scholarship has been to focus on video games, which 
contain additional protectable elements such as software code, images, and 
plots.9 The underlying question of the copyrightability of games per se often 
passes by unnoticed. 
  
 5 E.g., 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[H][3][a], at 2-
204.15 (2010). 
 6 Id. at 2-204.15 to .16. 
 7 See cases cited infra notes 21-27. 
 8 See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, The Adaptation of Copyright Law to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. 
REV. 171, 232-33 (1982); Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes 
from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1942-44 (2007). 
 9 The literature on copyright in video games is already voluminous. Early articles focused on the 
copyrightability of video games, but without sustained analysis of the traditional rule. See, e.g., Alan R. 
Glasser, Comment, Video Voodoo: Copyright in Video Game Computer Programs, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 
103, 103-04 (1986); Hemnes, supra note 8, at 173-74; William Patry, Electronic Audiovisual Games: 
Navigating the Maze of Copyright, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 4-5 (1983). Later articles have 
focused on more specific issues, such as the existence of virtual property rights, see, e.g., Joshua A.T. 
Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1049-52 (2005); James Grimmelmann, Virtual World 
Feudalism, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 126 (2009), http://thepocketpart.org/ylj-online/property-
law/740-virtual-world-feudalism; F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (2004), the relationship between players and game developers, see, e.g., Jack 
M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 
2043, 2046-47 (2004); Dan L. Burk, Electronic Gaming and the Ethics of Information Ownership, 
4 INT’L REV. INFO. ETHICS, Dec. 2005, at 39, 40; Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 1017, 1018-19 (2009); Greg Lastowka, User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 893, 894 (2008); Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the 
Dawn of the Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 264 (2007), or the rights of players to play or make modifica-
tions of game worlds, see, e.g., Mia Garlick, Player, Pirate, or Conducer? A Consideration of the Rights 
of Online Gamers, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 422, 426 (2005); W. Joss Nichols, Painting Through Pixels: 
The Case for a Copyright in Videogame Play, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101, 102 (2007); Tyler T. Ochoa, 
Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form(Gen) of the Alleged 
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This Article fills that gap. It concludes that the traditional doctrinal 
rule against copyright in games per se does, in the end, fit within the overall 
structure of copyright law. But the reasons why that is so are not obvious, 
and resolving the issue does more than simply locate the place of games  
in copyright doctrine. That is because games exist at the boundary of  
intellectual property law. Focusing on the precise nature of games—and 
why they are not within the scope of copyright—helps us define where 
those boundaries are,10 in the same way that focusing on whether beanbags 
are chairs or whether Pluto is a planet tells us something about the  
boundaries of our concepts of “chairs” and “planets.” 
In particular, examining the basis for the rule against the copyrighta-
bility of games helps illuminate one of the most difficult issues in copyright 
law: the nature of the exclusions from copyrightability listed in § 102(b).11 
One of the least well-understood of those exclusions is the one for  
“systems.” Older courts barring copyright in various systems failed to  
define the term.12 Modern courts tend to ignore it,13 and scholars have  
generally not given it any precise meaning.14 
It turns out, however, that recent scholarship on games generally  
defines games as “systems”;15 that, in turn, provides an entry point for  
understanding what systems are and why they are excluded from copyright. 
Games scholars have described games as, essentially, a “state machine”: a 
  
Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 991, 1027-32 (2004); John 
Baldrica, Note, Mod as Heck: Frameworks for Examining Ownership Rights in User-Contributed Con-
tent to Videogames, and a More Principled Evaluation of Expressive Appropriation in User-Modified 
Videogame Projects, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 681, 684-85 (2007). 
 10 Games also challenge important boundaries in patent law: they seem to exist right at the heart 
of one of the most debated topics in patent law today, which is whether information conveyed to humans 
is patentable. That issue manifests itself in the form of the so-called “printed matter” exception and 
“mental steps” doctrine in patent law, both of which have been applied to games. See, e.g., 2 JOHN 
GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 7.18 (2d ed. 2010). For an argument 
questioning the patentability of gameplay, see Shubha Ghosh, Patenting Games: Baker v. Selden Revi-
sited, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 871, 897-98 (2009). The question of the patentability of games is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 11 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Affiliated Enters., Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958, 961 (1st Cir. 1936); Affiliated Enters., 
Inc. v. Gantz, 86 F.2d 597, 598 (10th Cir. 1936); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 630 (S.D. Cal. 
1938).  
 13 See, e.g., Autoskill Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(focusing on the distinction between idea and expression); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 
1208, 1211-12 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that § 102(b) merely codifies the idea/expression dichotomy).  
 14 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1952 n.204 (citing 17 THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 496 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 15 See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 4; KATIE SALEN & ERIC ZIMMERMAN, RULES OF PLAY: 
GAME DESIGN FUNDAMENTALS 80 (2004). 
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means for correlating a range of permitted inputs (i.e., game moves) to a 
determinate set of outputs (i.e., changes in the game state).16 Games there-
fore do not communicate expression to the players so much as provide a 
forum for the gameplay experience to occur. The early cases on systems 
demonstrate a similar understanding of the term. Systems are shells that 
users fill with meaning; their primary purpose lies in that use, not in  
the communication of meaning from author to user. Systems are  
uncopyrightable because they are containers, not transmissions.17 
Part I of this Article briefly explains the history and current state of 
copyright doctrine on games. Part II considers the form of games and con-
cludes that they fall within at least one definition of “systems.” But that 
conclusion alone is not enough to determine whether games are  
uncopyrightable without knowing what sorts of systems are excluded under 
§ 102(b). Part III therefore reviews the development of the exclusion of 
“systems” in copyright law, arguing that the “systems” identified in 
§ 102(b) include games. Part IV then considers in more detail the reasons 
for the exclusion of both games and systems generally. 
I. WHAT COPYRIGHT LAW SAYS ABOUT GAMES 
For nearly a century, courts have uniformly held that games are not 
copyrightable.18 Courts have been considerably less forthcoming, however, 
with reasons for this doctrine. As Professor Pamela Samuelson has noted, 
“[t]he cases on games and rules are quite spare in analysis.”19 The rule 
emerged fully formed, without explanation, in the 1920s and 1930s, an era 
when opinions tended to be terse.20 Many cases involved simple games 
without their own boards, playing pieces, or other equipment—roller  
derbies,21 promotional contests,22 basketball tournaments,23 or bridge strate-
gies24—in which the plaintiff appeared to be attempting to protect against 
  
 16 See infra text accompanying notes 94-97. 
 17 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 18 See, e.g., Hoopla Sports & Entm’t, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 347, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 
Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 56 F. Supp. 987, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff’d, 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 
1945); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 630 (S.D. Cal. 1938); Whist Club v. Foster, 42 F.2d 782, 
782 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Downes v. Culbertson, 275 N.Y.S. 233, 243 (Sup. Ct. 1934); see also NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 5, at 2-204.15 & nn.69-70 (citing cases).  
 19 Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1943. 
 20 See, e.g., Whist Club, 42 F.2d at 782; Downes, 275 N.Y.S. at 243. 
 21 See Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. at 630; Seltzer v. Corem, 107 F.2d 75, 77 (7th Cir. 1939) (following 
Sunbrock). 
 22 See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967); Affiliated Enters., 
Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958, 959, 961 (1st Cir. 1936); Affiliated Enters., Inc. v. Gantz, 86 F.2d 597, 599 
(10th Cir. 1936).  
 23 See Hoopla Sports, 947 F. Supp. at 349. 
 24 See Russell v. Ne. Publ’g Co., 7 F. Supp. 571, 572 (D. Mass. 1934); Whist Club, 42 F.2d at 782. 
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use of a similar idea by a competitor. But even in cases involving more 
modern board games, such as Pass-The-Nuts,25 Scrabble,26 or Monopoly,27 
the copyrightability of the game in question received little attention.28 
The first case that mentioned such a rule in the United States was 
Whist Club v. Foster,29 a 1929 case from the Southern District of New 
York. The case involved a suit by the Whist Club for infringement of its 
book, Laws for Auction Bridge—1926, against Foster and others, who had 
published Foster’s Simplified Auction Bridge (with the New Laws).30  
Judging from the titles of the books and the language of the opinion, it 
seems that what Foster had done was include the Whist Club’s 1926 version 
of the rules of auction bridge in his book. But it is difficult to be certain of 
that or anything else about the case because the entire opinion takes up only 
one paragraph. It begins: “In the conventional laws or rules of a game, as 
distinguished from the forms or modes of expression in which they may be 
stated, there can be no literary property susceptible of copyright.”31 The 
court provided no citations for this rule, perhaps indicating that it was  
already well-established. The court noted that although the defendant  
“restated the same set of conventional precepts” in his own words, “[t]his 
under all the authorities he was entitled to do, and neither the general  
acceptance of the rules as official, nor, if it were true, their rejection as  
officious, could have any bearing on this controversy.”32 The Whist Club 
court unfortunately left it a mystery what “authorities” it had in mind. 
  
 25 See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1980). In Durham 
Industries, the counterclaim defendant had copied a game in which the object was to get plastic “nuts” 
inside a container. The defendant relabeled the buttons with Disney characters in place of the counter-
claimant’s original set of animals. Id. at 914. 
 26 See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s Scrabble strategy guide contained “unprotectable ideas”). 
 27 See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 300 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979); see 
also Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 615-17 (9th Cir. 1996) (copyright 
case involving academic tournament games); Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 
513 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1975) (copyright case concerning rulebook for Caroms).  
 28 Since the early 1980s, a number of cases have considered the issue of copyright in video games. 
Early on, however, courts concluded that, in addition to protection for their software code, video games 
could be protected as audiovisual works, just like cartoons or films. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kauf-
man, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.18[H][3][b], at 
2-204.16 to .17, 2-204.21 (citing cases); Hemnes, supra note 8, at 179 (citing cases). Relying on a facile 
analogy between video games and films, very few of these cases have invoked or considered the rule 
against the copyrightability of games. 
 29 42 F.2d 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). 
 30 Id. at 782. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. Whist Club echoes a much later decision in which a private organization could not claim a 
copyright in its model codes after the codes were enacted by legislation. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code 
Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
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The likeliest point of origin for the rule is the Rules and Regulations 
for the Registration of Claims to Copyright, adopted by the Copyright  
Office in 1910, the year after Congress substantially revised the Copyright 
Act. The Copyright Act of 1909, unlike the 1976 Act, limited copyright to 
particular forms of works: books, maps, musical compositions, and so 
forth.33 The regulations expressly excluded games from registration as 
books, as works of art, or as pictorial works.34 The reasoning appears to 
have been that games are functional. For example, section 16(k) of the 
regulations, excluding games from registration as pictures, stated that 
“[a]rticles of utilitarian purpose do not become capable of copyright  
registration because they consist in part of pictures which in themselves are 
copyrightable, e.g., puzzles, games, rebuses, badges, buttons, buckles, pins, 
novelties of every description, or similar articles.”35 The Corpus Juris entry 
on copyrights, published just a few years later, similarly grouped games 
with cases involving index systems as uncopyrightable “articles designed 
for physical use rather than to convey information or intellectual  
conceptions.”36 
Later cases added little to the analysis, often merely citing earlier  
decisions, including Whist Club, as authority for the rule. Chamberlin v. 
Uris Sales Corp.37 is typical. The sum total of the court’s discussion of the 
issue is as follows: “[I]t is very doubtful if rules of a game can, in any 
event, be copyrightable subject matter.”38 The court cited Whist Club and 
  
 33 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77, repealed by Copyright Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The 
exclusivity of the list was challenged almost immediately by new forms of works. Motion pictures, for 
example, did not clearly fit within any of the original categories, so Congress amended the Act just three 
years later to add them. See Act of Aug. 24, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, § 5, 37 Stat. 488, 488. 
 34 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. NO. 15, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF 
CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT §§ 5, 12, 16 (1910), reprinted in RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS 
HISTORY AND ITS LAW 496-99 (1912). 
 35 Id. § 16; see also id. § 5 (“The term ‘book’ cannot be applied to . . . [d]irections on scales, or 
dials, or mathematical or other instruments; puzzles; games; rebuses; labels; wrappers; formulae on 
boxes, bottles, and other receptacles of articles for sale or meant to accompany such articles.”); id. § 12 
(“No copyright [as a work of art] exists in toys, games, dolls, advertising novelties, instruments or tools 
of any kind, glassware, embroideries, garments, laces, woven fabrics, or any similar articles.”).  
 36 See 13 C.J. Copyright and Literary Property § 124 (1917). The Corpus Juris entry also cited 
early systems cases, such as Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith & Co., 78 F. 479 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 
1896), aff’d, 82 F. 314 (7th Cir. 1897). For a discussion of Amberg, see infra text accompanying notes 
140-42. Another possible source for the rule is British case law, which was cited frequently on matters 
of copyright doctrine through the early decades of the twentieth century. Research for this Article did 
not turn up any early British cases on games that could have been relied on by the Whist Club court, 
however. 
 37 56 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff’d, 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 38 Id. at 988. The Chamberlin court was asked to rule on the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant 
had copied his rules for the game acey-deucey. Id. The most significant problem the plaintiff faced was 
that he did not create the game; acey-deucey is a very old variant of backgammon that may have origi-
nated in India. See id. 
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two other cases, neither of which offered an extended analysis.39 Perhaps 
due to the paucity of analysis, the influential treatise Nimmer on Copyright 
begins its discussion of copyright in games with a somewhat skeptical  
report of what prior cases have held: “It is said that games are not  
copyrightable, but this general proposition is subject to qualification.”40 
The qualifications Nimmer refers to are extensive. While a game itself 
may not be copyrightable, all of its constituent elements are. The board, 
box, or cards may be protected as graphic or pictorial works, or even 
maps;41 game pieces may be protected sculptural works; even a particular 
statement of the rules of a game can be given limited protection against 
verbatim copying.42 The limited nature of the rule against the copyrightabil-
ity of games is, on its face, rather odd. Imagine there were a rule that  
“novels are not copyrightable,” but that a novel’s plot, characters, setting, 
dialog, and cover art all were. What would be the point of such a rule?43 
Two possibilities emerge from the cases. First, several cases describe 
games, and game rules,44 as unprotectable ideas.45 Copyright, as is well 
  
 39 See id. (citing Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Cal. 1938); Downes v. Culbertson, 
275 N.Y.S. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1934)). 
 40 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, at 2-204.15 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 41 Id. at 2-204.15 to .16; see, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 20 F. Cas. 722, 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1877) 
(No. 11,791) (holding that the design of playing cards was copyrightable); Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton 
Bradley Co., 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30, 35 (N.D. Ill. 1961) (holding that a set of flash cards was copy-
rightable), aff’d, 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963). 
 42 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, at 2-204.16. Copyright protection in a particular expression 
of the rules is limited in order to prevent game designers from using their copyright to prohibit any other 
description of the same rules, which would give the game designer effective control over the game itself. 
See, e.g., Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying 
merger doctrine to rules); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967) (“We 
cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.”). 
 43 Considering the same questions, Thomas M.S. Hemnes concludes that the rule is a historical 
relic: “‘Copyright does not protect games’ is an example of a principle of law that may have grown 
larger and more rigid than the facts of the seminal cases warranted.” Hemnes, supra note 8, at 174. The 
Nimmer treatise similarly suggests that the rule may need to be revisited in the context of video games. 
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, at 2-204.16 (“[T]he blanket rule of exclusion for games must be 
rethought as must so much else in the copyright arena insofar as it applies to works of technology he-
ralded by the computer revolution.”).  
 44 Most scholars of games locate the formal structure of games in the games’ rules. See, e.g., 
DAVID PARLETT, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF BOARD GAMES 3 (1999) (“[W]e may go further, and say 
‘Every game is its rules,’ for they are what define it.”). For games that lack any specialized equipment—
e.g., card games, word games, tag, etc.—this is self-evident. 
 45 See, e.g., Allen, 89 F.3d at 617 (explaining that games “consist of abstract rules and play ideas” 
that are likely to merge with the expression of those rules and ideas (quoting Midway Mfg. Co. v. Ban-
dai-Am., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 148 (D.N.J. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Landsberg v. 
Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that Scrabble strate-
gies were unprotectable ideas); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 300 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (“[B]usiness ideas, such as a game concept, cannot be copyrighted.”); Morrissey v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 262 F. Supp. 737, 738 (D. Mass.) (stating that the substance of a contest was not protecta-
ble), aff’d, 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 630 (S.D. Cal. 1938) 
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known, protects only the expression of an idea, not the idea itself.46  
Drawing the line between idea and expression has long been recognized as 
devilishly difficult. But it is a task that is made even more challenging by 
the fact that the term “ideas” has something of a dual meaning in copyright 
law. On the one hand, it refers to information that is simply too general or 
abstract to qualify as protectable expression.47 For example, a short  
summary of a much longer work, such as the one-sentence descriptions of 
potential films featured in the 1992 film The Player, is an “idea” in this 
sense.48 But the term “ideas” is also often used as shorthand for matter  
excluded from copyrightability under a variety of doctrines, including not 
only ideas, but also facts, scènes à faire, and functional expression that 
might qualify as patentable subject matter.49 Several of those doctrines have 
been collected in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which excludes ideas,  
procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, 
and discoveries from copyright protection.50 
To the extent that courts have employed the term “ideas” to mean that 
rules are too general or abstract to qualify as expression, the argument is 
unsatisfactory. A complete specification of a game’s rules is as detailed as 
the game gets. And often those rules can be fairly specific. The rules for the 
Wizards of the Coast board game Axis & Allies, for example, are 39 pages 
long and incredibly detailed.51 The rules for Advanced Dungeons &  
  
(“Even if plaintiffs’ books be held to describe a game or sporting event, the rules thereof, as ideas, are 
not copyrightable.”); Russell v. Ne. Publ’g Co., 7 F. Supp. 571, 572 (D. Mass. 1934) (holding that there 
was no copyright in a bridge problem that “illustrat[ed] a principle of play” and “the principles of con-
tract bridge applicable to its solution”); Downes v. Culbertson, 275 N.Y.S. 233, 243 (Sup. Ct. 1934) 
(concluding that a system for playing contract bridge “is an idea” outside the scope of protection of both 
copyright and patent). 
 46 E.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.3, at 2:27 (3d ed. Supp. 2010) (citing 
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)).  
 47 See id. § 2.3.1, at 2:29 to :30; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 2-23. 
 48 See THE PLAYER (Avenue Entertainment, Inc. 1992). 
 49 Goldstein suggests that “idea” means all unprotected matter. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, 
§ 2.3.1, at 2:30 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 50 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
 51 See LARRY HARRIS, AXIS & ALLIES: OPERATIONS MANUAL (Jennifer Clarke Wilkes ed., 2004). 
For example, the rules provide for canals:  
There are two canals on the game board . . . . A canal is not considered a space, so it 
doesn’t count against the number of spaces a unit can move. A canal doesn’t block land 
movement: Land units can move freely between Trans-Jordan and Anglo-Egypt. 
If you want to move sea units through a canal, your side (but not necessarily your 
power) must control it at the start of your turn (that is, you can’t use it the turn you capture 
it). The Panama Canal is controlled by the side that controls Panama. The Suez Canal is con-
trolled by the side that controls both Anglo-Egypt and Trans-Jordan. If one side controls An-
glo-Egypt and the other controls Trans-Jordan, the Suez is closed to sea units. 
Id. at 8. There are creative choices, or judgments, at work here, which is generally sufficient for a mod-
ern copyright. See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 n.4, 
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Dragons are even longer, spanning several books.52 It appears that game 
rules are not “ideas” in the general and abstract sense of the term. 
The other possible explanation that emerges from the case law is that 
games are uncopyrightable systems or processes.53 Indeed, in designating 
game rules as unprotectable “ideas,” many of the cases may have actually 
been using that term more broadly to claim that games impermissibly cross 
over from copyrightable territory to patentable subject matter.54 That is, 
some of the cases on games appear to have concluded that games fall within 
one of the five categories in § 102(b) devoted to drawing the line between 
patents and copyrights: procedures, processes, systems, methods of  
operation, and discoveries.55 
  
68 n.8 (2d Cir. 1994). For instance, the game designers could have decided to make canals count as a 
space for movement purposes or to allow ships to pass through when only one side of the canal is in a 
team’s possession. Indeed, it was a creative choice to put canals on the board at all. 
 52 See GARY GYGAX, ADVANCED DUNGEONS & DRAGONS: DUNGEON MASTERS GUIDE (rev. ed. 
1979); GARY GYGAX, ADVANCED DUNGEONS & DRAGONS: MONSTER MANUAL (4th ed. 1979); GARY 
GYGAX, ADVANCED DUNGEONS & DRAGONS: PLAYERS HANDBOOK (6th prtg. 1980). 
 53 See Seltzer v. Corem, 107 F.2d 75, 76-77 (7th Cir. 1939) (holding that the rules for roller skat-
ing races were an uncopyrightable system); Affiliated Enters., Inc., v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958, 961 (1st Cir. 
1936) (holding that a system of staging games or contests was not copyrightable); Affiliated Enters., 
Inc., v. Gantz, 86 F.2d 597, 598 (10th Cir. 1936) (same); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 630 
(S.D. Cal. 1938) (holding that the rules for roller skating races were an uncopyrightable system); Down-
es v. Culbertson, 275 N.Y.S. 233, 242 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (holding that a system for playing contract bridge 
was not copyrightable). Nimmer summarizes the rule from the cases as “no copyright may be obtained 
in the system or manner of playing a game,” analogizing the rule to one barring copyright in “a system 
or manner of doing business.” See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, at 2-204.15 & n.70. Nimmer also 
states that copyright will not allow “a monopoly in the method of play itself, as distinguished from the 
form of instructions for such play.” Id. at 2-204.16. 
 54 For example, the New York trial court in Downes, a case decided well prior to § 102(b)’s codi-
fication, held that Culbertson’s “system is an idea” that could not be protected under either copyright or 
patent. Downes, 275 N.Y.S. at 243. 
 55 The term “discovery” is ambiguous: it could refer to factual information found (i.e., discovered) 
by the author, or it could refer to inventions, just as it is used in the Patent and Copyright Clause. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries”). Under either interpretation, there is at least a little redundancy with other 
portions of § 102. Under the discovery-as-invention reading, inventions include patentable processes, 
methods, and procedures, making those terms redundant to the extent they were intended to stand for 
patentable subject matter, although excluding inventions would add machines, manufactures, and com-
pounds to the list. On the other hand, as Justice O’Connor explained in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., facts are not original and therefore not within the scope of copyright set forth in 
§ 102(a), making an exclusion for discoveries-as-facts in § 102(b) unnecessary. See 499 U.S. 340, 347-
48 (1991); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.03[E], at 2-36.4. The legislative history does not 
resolve this question, but the current Register of Copyrights has stated that she believes that Congress 
intended “discovery” to mean “inventions,” which is probably the correct reading. See Samuelson, supra 
note 8, at 1951 n.202. 
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For example, in Seltzer v. Sunbrock,56 the plaintiff, Leo Seltzer,  
copyrighted two pamphlets describing fictional roller derbies—roller  
derbies that just happened to employ the same rules as the real-life roller 
derbies Seltzer was staging across the country.57 The pamphlets were, in 
effect, an ingenious attempt to embed Seltzer’s rules for his roller derby in 
an incontestably fictional, and therefore copyrightable, work. It seems  
likely that the reason for such an unusual presentation of the rules was that 
Seltzer already had some inkling that a more typical version of the rules 
would not be given copyright protection. But the tactic failed. The court 
held that “[w]hat Seltzer really composed was a description of a system for 
conducting races on roller skates,” and “[a] system, as such, can never be 
copyrighted,” only patented.58 
Likewise, in Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gantz59 and Affiliated  
Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber,60 the plaintiff created a contest for promoting 
movie theatres called “Bank Night” and sued to stop others from holding 
similar contests without its permission.61 Both the First and Tenth Circuits 
rejected the claims, however, holding that the instructions for holding 
“Bank Night” contests were a “plan or system” and thus not within the 
scope of the plaintiff’s copyright.62 Affiliated Enterprises’s copyright over 
those instructions gave it no exclusive right to the games that arose from 
those instructions. 
The idea that games are systems is a promising theory for explaining 
why games are excluded from copyrightability. Even some game scholars, 
quite apart from any concern about copyright law, have described games as 
systems, as discussed further below. There are just two difficulties that 
  
 56 22 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Cal. 1938). 
 57 Id. at 623-25. 
 58 Id. at 630; see also id. (“Nor is the system of staging a game or spectacle covered.”). In support 
of this argument, the court cited Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), Brief English Systems, Inc. v. 
Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1931), and Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). Baker and Brief 
English Systems are both systems cases, holding that instructional materials do not extend copyright to 
the art being taught. Baker, 101 U.S. at 101-02; Brief English Sys., 48 F.2d at 556. But Eichel is not that 
kind of case at all; it is a case alleging similarities between two plays at a high level of abstraction. See 
Eichel, 241 F. at 409. Eichel is very much like the more famous Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122 (“A comedy based upon conflicts between Irish 
and Jews, into which the marriage of their children enters, is no more susceptible of copyright than the 
outline of Romeo and Juliet.”). That indicates that the Sunbrock court saw game rules as both a “sys-
tem” and too abstract for copyright protection, in some important way. 
Not happy with the result of the California litigation, Seltzer manufactured a case in Indiana 
against a willing defendant who admitted infringement. See Corem, 107 F.2d at 75-76 (“This is an 
exceedingly friendly suit.”). The district court did not catch on, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, ex-
pressly adopting the reasoning of Sunbrock. Id. at 77. 
 59 86 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1936). 
 60 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936). 
 61 Gruber, 86 F.2d at 959-60; Gantz, 86 F.2d at 598-99. 
 62 Gruber, 86 F.2d at 961; Gantz, 86 F.2d at 598. 
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must be overcome. The first is that the nature of games is obscure. And the 
second is that no one can explain what a system is. The remainder of this 
Article will play these two mysteries off each other in order to arrive at an 
understanding of why games are systems and why such systems are not 
copyrightable. 
II. WHY GAMES ARE SYSTEMS 
Are games ideas, processes, or systems? Answering this question  
requires focusing on the nature of games. Defining games with even  
tolerable precision is an extraordinarily difficult task.63 Games come in 
many different varieties. There are games played with boards and pieces, 
which can range from the relatively simple (e.g., Parcheesi, backgammon, 
chess, Go) to the incredibly complex (e.g., Advanced Squad Leader, Drang 
nach Osten).64 Even board games with simple rules can produce extremely 
complex behavior—chess, as is well known, is difficult to play well. There 
are games that require only standard pieces of equipment not specific to the 
game: four square, hopscotch, card games, and tic-tac-toe. There are  
pen-and-paper role-playing games, in which players lead an imagined  
avatar through a fictional universe. There are parlor games (e.g., charades), 
word games, or children’s games (e.g., tag) that may require no equipment 
at all. There are sports, which combine the intellectual aspects of play with 
significant physical skill: football, basketball, and tennis are all games. 
And, of course, there are computer games, which not only replicate many of 
the forms of games listed above, but also add new games, possible only on 
a computer: first-person-shooters, flight simulators, adventure games,  
survival horror, real-time strategy, “god” games, and more. 
It is somewhat difficult to craft a concise definition of games that  
accounts for all of this variety. Indeed, some scholars have despaired of 
defining “games” with precision.65 It is important to keep in mind that all 
definitions are, to some extent, imprecise; even seemingly simple terms 
  
 63 See PARLETT, supra note 44, at 1 (“[T]he word is used for so many different activities that it is 
not worth insisting on any proposed definition. All in all, it is a slippery lexicological customer, with 
many friends and relations in a wide variety of fields.”). Ludwig Wittgenstein famously chose games as 
an illustration of his argument that intrinsic definitions are impossible and that words are defined only 
by “family resemblances.” See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 4, paras. 65-67 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 64 See Advanced Squad Leader, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Advanced_Squad_Leader (last visited Nov. 10, 2010); Europa (wargame), WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europa_(wargame) (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). Drang nach Osten, part of 
the Europa series, was released in 1973 by Game Designers Workshop. Europa (wargame), supra. It 
was, for a time, used widely as a metaphor in wargaming circles for a game so complex as to be nearly 
unplayable—the gaming equivalent of listening to Wagner’s entire Ring cycle in one sitting. 
 65 See PARLETT, supra note 44, at 1. 
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such as “chair” have boundary cases.66 For most purposes, it is adequate to 
have a definition that accounts for most uses in everyday language.  
However, some concepts are difficult to define even under those lax condi-
tions. The wide variety of definitions posed for “games” indicates that it 
may be such a term. What possibly explains this is that games depend, for a 
significant portion of their attraction, on the aesthetic or entertainment ex-
perience generated by the game. Such a subjective component to the expe-
rience appears to make the definition of “art,” for example, difficult as well. 
Nevertheless, a number of scholars have tried their hand at defining 
games.67 Many of these efforts have occurred within the past two decades, 
as a burgeoning literature in the study of games has emerged, spurred in 
large part by the rise of video games as an entertainment medium. Several 
of the scholars writing in this area have attempted to define what it is that 
all games—video games, board games, and even simple games such as 
rock-paper-scissors—share in common. No single definition has achieved 
widespread acceptance. However, a few common elements stand out: rules, 
space, players, and goals. 
A. Rules  
The first element that game scholars largely agree on is that we define 
games by their rules. As discussed above, the rules of a game are some-
times thought of as instructions for playing the game, but they are not; rules 
do not tell players precisely what to do. Rather, they place broad constraints 
on what players can do and conversely define certain actions as valid within 
the scope of the game. The rules perform two other functions: they establish 
initial conditions, and they define end conditions, including victory. 
Thus, the rules define the boundaries of the game, but they do not  
specify precisely what occurs during a game in play. Consider the rules for 
one of the simplest games there is: tic-tac-toe. The rules for tic-tac-toe can 
be easily stated: 
1. Play occurs on a 3 by 3 grid of 9 empty squares. 
2. Two players alternate marking empty squares, the first player marking Xs and the second 
player marking Os. 
3. If one player places three of the same marks in a row, that player wins. 
4. If the spaces are all filled and there is no winner, the game ends in a draw.68 
The rules for tic-tac-toe fulfill all of the conditions listed above. Rule 1 
establishes the initial state of the game: a blank three-by-three grid. Rule 2 
  
 66 For example, is a beanbag a chair? What about modern seats that have knee-rests but no back? 
 67 For useful summaries, see JESPER JUUL, HALF-REAL: VIDEO GAMES BETWEEN REAL RULES 
AND FICTIONAL WORLDS 29-36 (2005); SALEN & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 15, at 73-80. 
 68 SALEN & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 15, at 128. 
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defines the permitted and valid moves; for example, a player cannot mark 
two “X’s” at a time, nor can she write the letter “B.” Rule 3 defines the 
victory condition, and with it the goal of the game. Finally, Rule 4 provides 
for end conditions other than victory. 
None of these rules tell the first player precisely what to do—where to 
mark his or her “X.”69 Each player is confronted with a range of options 
when he or she first moves, and it is out of the choices the player makes 
that game play emerges. But almost every player soon learns that the  
number of successful strategies for tic-tac-toe is extremely limited. Indeed, 
a single algorithm can describe the optimal strategy for each side that, if 
followed, produces inescapable draws.70 The discovery of this feature of the 
game is precisely the point at which children lose interest in playing tic-tac-
toe.71 A game that offers no meaningful choice is hardly a game at all.72 
B. Space  
Second, games are instantly recognizable by participants and  
spectators as occurring within some sort of separate domain. The Dutch 
cultural historian Johan Huizinga was the first to focus on this odd quality 
of games. Although his focus was on play in general, much of what  
Huizinga wrote was applicable to games, which are in some sense a subset 
of play. According to Huizinga, play is “a stepping out of ‘real’ life into a 
temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own.”73 The  
separation is both temporal and spatial: 
All play moves and has its being within a play-ground marked off beforehand either mate-
rially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course. . . . The arena, the card-table, the mag-
ic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, the tennis court, the court of justice, etc., are all in 
form and function play-grounds, i.e. forbidden spots, isolated, hedged round, hallowed, with-
  
 69 In addition, none of the rules tell the players how to determine who moves first—that is what 
Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman call an “implicit rule,” one of the innumerable rules players implicitly 
adopt when they play games like tic-tac-toe. See id. at 130. The formal, constitutive rules are thus sur-
rounded by a penumbra of informal, implicit rules. Another implicit rule might be that each player has 
to move within a reasonable time. 
 70 See id. at 235. 
 71 This moment of discovering the meaning of futility was memorably dramatized in the film, 
WarGames. See WARGAMES (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 1983). 
 72 Chutes & Ladders presents a different example of this phenomenon. Like tic-tac-toe, Chutes & 
Ladders presents the illusion of choice that dissipates as one grows older. But in Chutes & Ladders, the 
choice is not obviated by learning the decisive strategy, but rather by discovering the lack of control 
over random events. That is, progress in Chutes & Ladders is completely determined by randomly 
generated numbers. This is significantly different from gambling, where the choice and size of the 
wager are within the control of the player. 
 73 HUIZINGA, supra note 1, at 8. 
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in which special rules obtain. All are temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated 
to the performance of an act apart.74 
Huizinga’s notion of the “magic circle” in which games take place has been 
profoundly influential among game theorists.75 It is a shorthand way of ex-
pressing the somewhat mysterious transformation of real space into an im-
aginary “game-space,” where actions are suddenly understood and invested 
with new social meanings, without the need for much in the way of intro-
ductory explanations or explicit signals.76 As one game theorist has put it:  
“Players and fans and officials of any game or sport develop an acute awareness of the 
game’s ‘frame’ or context, but we would be hard pressed to explain in writing, even after 
careful thought, exactly what the signs are. After all, even an umpire’s yelling of ‘Play Ball’ 
is not the exact moment the game starts.”77 
This feature of games is not unique to games—many social situations are 
attended by subtle social cues that indicate that a separate or unique set of 
rules are in play. Huizinga himself recognized this in analogizing games to 
rituals such as marriage ceremonies or court proceedings.78 Even less  
formalized social situations, such as dates or parties, have context-specific 
rules governing behavior. What is interesting about games, at least for our 
purposes, is that the “magic circle” of the bounds of the game designates a 
collectively imagined space in which the game rules have effect. Those 
rules hold sway by a sort of illusion; the effect can be dispelled by an  
ostentatious refusal to play along—a spoil-sport, in other words—or by a 
call from a player for a “time out”—a request to step outside the magic  
circle and its assigned roles.79 But so long as the rules have sway, they not 
only govern the behavior of the players, but they provide the meaning of 
  
 74 Id. at 10. 
 75 See, e.g., SALEN & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 15, at 95; Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 185 (2004); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Magic Circle, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 823, 824-25 (2009). The “magic circle” was just one of several play environments listed by 
Huizinga in Homo Ludens, evidently referring to a circle drawn by a sorcerer in attempting to cast a 
spell (or at least by someone pretending to be a sorcerer). See HUIZINGA, supra note 1, at 10; see, e.g., 
Michael D. Bailey, From Sorcery to Witchcraft: Clerical Conceptions of Magic in the Later Middle 
Ages, 76 SPECULUM 960, 973-74 (2001) (discussing the use of “magic circles” in sorcery). Huizinga’s 
notion of “play” was fairly broad, including, for example, lawsuits. See HUIZINGA, supra note 1, at 10. 
A note about terminology: this Article uses the terms “game theorists” and “game theory” to refer to the 
study of games, not to the study of decision making pioneered by mathematicians such as John von 
Neumann and John Nash. 
 76 See HUIZINGA, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining that play “contains its own course and meaning”). 
 77 SALEN & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 15, at 94 (quoting Stephen Sniderman, Unwritten Rules, 
LIFE OF GAMES, Oct. 1999, at 2, 4, http://www.gamepuzzles .com/tlog/tlog4.htm). 
 78 See HUIZINGA, supra note 1, at 18, 76, 83.  
 79 Huizinga notes that the word “illusion” itself comes from Latin roots meaning “in-play.” See id. 
at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2011] GAMES AND OTHER UNCOPYRIGHTABLE SYSTEMS 453 
what happens within the game-space.80 Game rules, in other words, are very 
far from simple instructions. 
C. Players  
A third feature of games is that they necessarily have one or more 
players. This may not initially appear to distinguish games from any other 
form of expression that needs to be performed: both music and plays  
require “players” for audiences to hear; even films and sound recordings 
require mechanical players for audiences to perceive. But the relationship 
between players and games is more existential than that. Players are  
necessary for the full realization of games in a way that musicians, actors, 
DVD players, and MP3 players are not. 
Before proceeding further, it is important to make a critical distinction 
between different uses of the word “game,” one that even the game studies 
literature tends to overlook. A “game” can refer to the materials and  
information necessary to play the game—the “game-in-the-box,” so to 
speak, or the game form. This is likely the sense in which the term is used 
in the legal rule that “games are not copyrightable.” But “game” can also 
refer to a single instance of a game—the “game in play.” Both senses of the 
term are so familiar that we barely notice them. Chess is a game; but we 
also play a game of chess, meaning the particular moves made by two  
players on a particular occasion. Chess is a form of a game which, when 
played, produces many instances of games of chess.81 
In defining games to require players, game theorists seem to most 
clearly have the second definition of “game” in mind—games in play, or 
instances of games.82 A game in play clearly needs players, or nothing will 
happen. But game forms also presuppose the existence of players. A game 
form is incomplete without play; it establishes the conditions for game play, 
  
 80 See id. at 9. 
 81 For example, one of the most famous games of chess is game 3 of the World Chess Champion-
ship in 1972, in which Bobby Fischer turned the tide against Boris Spassky and won with innovative 
play as Black. A list of the actual moves Fischer and Spassky made on that occasion can be easily lo-
cated on the web. See, e.g., Match of the Century, BOBBY-FISCHER.NET, http://www.bobby-
fischer.net/match_of_the_century.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
 82 Jesper Juul, Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman, and Greg Costikyan all explicitly cite players as 
an element of a game. See JUUL, supra note 67, at 36; SALEN & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 15; Greg 
Costikyan, I Have No Words & I Must Design, INTERACTIVE FANTASY, 1994, reprinted in THE GAME 
DESIGN READER: A RULES OF PLAY ANTHOLOGY 192, 196 (Katie Salen & Eric Zimmerman eds., 2006). 
Others refer to games as an “activity” or an “exercise” rather than a material object. See CLARK C. ABT, 
SERIOUS GAMES 6 (1970) (emphasis omitted); AVEDON & SUTTON-SMITH, supra note 1, at 405 (em-
phasis omitted). Bernard Suits, by contrast, defines “to play a game,” rather than “game” itself, which at 
least implicitly recognizes the distinction. See BERNARD SUITS, THE GRASSHOPPER: GAMES, LIFE AND 
UTOPIA 34, 41 (1978). David Kelley similarly defines games as a “form of recreation.” DAVID KELLEY, 
THE ART OF REASONING 50 (1990) (emphasis omitted). 
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but not its particulars. Games thus require players in a more substantial way 
than musical works, plays, films, and sound recordings do. A DVD requires 
a player to convey its expression to an audience, but the player does not add 
to the content on the DVD in any way; that content is fixed in the disk. 
Even the contributions of musicians and actors, who unquestionably add 
something to a work as they convey it to the audience, are relatively  
modest; the work conveyed is for the most part the work fixed in the sheet 
music or script. But a game is an empty shell until it is played. As noted 
above, the rules of a game and its equipment provide the boundaries and 
meaning of play, but not the play itself—the most important aspect of a 
game, its raison d’être. 
D. Goals  
Finally, games have goals, that is, endpoints or victory conditions—
something that the players strive to attain. This is another feature of games 
that makes them superficially similar to processes. But the goal in a game 
stands in an odd relationship to the game—it, like much else about the 
game, is defined by the rules. That is, it is a part of the game, rather than 
something external to it. This is completely different from a patentable 
process, which is “an operation or series of steps leading to a useful  
result.”83 The “useful result” of a process is some need that preexisted the 
process—indeed, that unmet need is typically what spurred the creation of 
the process in the first place. Game rules, by contrast, define the games’ 
objectives, which have meaning only within the “magic circle.” There is no 
value to having three “X’s” in a row other than winning a game of tic-tac-
toe. The victory conditions exist purely for the purpose of playing the 
game.84 
The goals of games likewise distinguish them from copyrightable 
works as well. Authors may have goals for their works—to entertain, to 
provoke, to educate. And readers may also have goals in approaching a 
work—sometimes the same goal as the author. But in games, the goals 
drive the way in which the game unfolds, while it is unfolding. This is  
fundamentally different from other works. The goals that a member of the 
audience has may affect how that person chooses to think about a work as it 
  
 83 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03, at 1-109 (2010). The exact nature of the 
“useful result” necessary for a patentable process was recently reviewed by the Supreme Court. See 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). In Bilski, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s limitation of 
patentable processes to those that are tied to a machine or transform tangible matter into a different state 
or thing. See id. at 3226-27. However, the Court declined to identify its own test for patentable 
processes, holding the specific invention at issue in Bilski too abstract to be patentable under any stan-
dard. See id. at 1329-30. 
 84 Cf. SUITS, supra note 82, at 32 (“[G]ames require obedience to rules which limit the permissi-
ble means to a sought end, and where such rules are obeyed just so that such activity can occur.”). 
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is playing, but those goals do not affect the work itself. The work itself is 
like a path through a maze that has been mapped out by the author and is 
only gradually revealed to the audience. The audience may have different 
thoughts along the way, but the path remains unchanged. A game, however, 
is just the maze. The players choose one of innumerable paths through it.85 
The goals of a game provide the only guidance the game gives; they, in 
conjunction with the rules, help to establish a structure, but they do not  
provide content.86 Games are a forum for players, rather than authors, to 
exercise meaningful choice as to how the game will play out. 
E. Games as Systems  
Recent scholarship on games has attempted to meld these various ele-
ments of games by describing games as “systems” in which they all come 
together. For example, Professor Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman define 
games as “a system in which players engage in an artificial conflict, defined 
by rules, that results in a quantifiable outcome.”87 Game scholars are hardly 
alone in reaching this conclusion. Several cases, including some of the ear-
liest cases on games, also imply that games are systems,88 although none 
clearly state that notion as the basis for their exclusion from copyright law. 
Copyright scholars have expressed uncertainty on the issue but have specu-
lated that the basis for the exclusion may well be that games are systems.89 
That would appear to clinch the issue; games are systems, and they are 
therefore excluded under § 102(b). The difficulty with this resolution is that 
no one has determined precisely what a “system” is. In both the game  
literature and the copyright literature, “system” has been defined by  
referencing the first, most general definition in the dictionary. Salen and 
Zimmerman rely on the first definition they found on Dictionary.com:  
  
 85 Tic-tac-toe, one of the simplest games, offers 211,568 possible paths. JUUL, supra note 67, at 
60. 
 86 For example, Juul has noted that nothing in the rules of the computer game Counter-Strike 
specifies that it must be played as a team game. JUUL, supra note 67, at 89. What makes it a cooperative 
game is that the goals produce that sort of play; cooperative play is an emergent property of Counter-
Strike because of the way the goals are structured. See id. at 89-90. 
 87 SALEN & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 15; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 4 (“[A] game is a 
closed, formal system that subjectively represents a subset of reality.”). Juul defines games similarly: “A 
game is a rule-based system with a variable and quantifiable outcome, where different outcomes are 
assigned different values, the player exerts effort in order to influence the outcome, the player feels 
emotionally attached to the outcome, and the consequences of the activity are negotiable.” JUUL, supra 
note 67, at 36 (emphasis omitted). 
 88 See cases cited supra note 53. 
 89 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, at 2-204.15 n.70 (“Likewise, copyright may not be 
claimed in a system or manner of doing business.”); Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1944 (“Although the 
game case law did not invoke the system, method, or process exclusions from copyright, this cluster of 
cases is consistent with these exclusions.”). 
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“A group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a 
complex whole.”90 Copyright scholar Pamela Samuelson likewise relies 
heavily on the first definition in The Oxford English Dictionary: “[A] set or 
assemblage of things connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to 
form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement 
according to some scheme or plan . . . .”91 
The problem with these definitions is that they are hopelessly  
overbroad. Defining “systems” as any group of interrelated elements  
forming a complex whole would sweep in not only games, but almost all 
copyrightable works as well. Games would be indistinguishable from  
puzzles, plays, movies, novels, music, machines, factories, trees, galaxies, 
or innumerable other objects. Whatever game scholars and copyright law 
mean by the term “system,” it cannot be all sets of interdependent things 
forming complex unities. Fortunately there is a wide variety of other  
definitions to choose from. The Oxford English Dictionary lists eleven  
primary definitions, classified into three categories.92 Even simpler  
dictionaries list five or more separate definitions.93 The challenge is to  
identify which of these definitions best corresponds to the use of the term in 
the games literature and in cases finding systems to be uncopyrightable. 
The word “system” is used in a number of different contexts.  
“System” can refer to a group of parts that work together to achieve the 
same goal or general function, such as, in anatomy, the nervous system or 
digestive system, or, for computers, an operating system. It can also refer to 
a set of interacting agents or things that is the subject of study: for example, 
an ecosystem or economic system. In some cases, “systems” may be  
relatively isolated from other objects: for example, a solar system only 
weakly interacts with neighboring bodies. But in other cases, the boundaries 
of a “system” may be somewhat arbitrary. In physics and thermodynamics, 
a system is simply the portion of the universe under analysis, which may 
have more or less interaction with its surroundings. “System” can refer to a 
  
 90 SALEN & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 15, at 50. The definition on Dictionary.com has since been 
revised slightly. Compare id. (“A group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming 
a complex whole.”), with System, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/system (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2010) (defining system as “an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a 
complex or unitary whole”). 
 91 Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1952 n.204 (quoting 17 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 496 
(2d ed. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The problem is not limited to copyright and games 
scholarship. An entire body of scientific inquiry—systems theory—is founded on an extremely broad 
definition of what comprises a “system”: “a set of entities with relations between them.” See Alexander 
Backlund, The Definition of System, 29 KYBERNETES 444, 444 (2000) (quoting BÖRJE LANGEFORS, 
ESSAYS ON INFOLOGY 55 (Bo Dahlbom ed., 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a general 
overview of systems theory, see Francis Heylighen & Cliff Joslyn, What Is Systems Theory?, PRINCIPIA 
CYBERNETICA WEB (Nov. 1, 1992), http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SYSTHEOR.html. 
 92 See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 496-98. 
 93 See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1308 (2d ed. 1997). 
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set of interacting or interdependent parts that produce determinate  
outcomes: a system of government or a judicial system, for example. It can 
also refer to networks or decision trees: betting systems, rail systems, or 
systems of belief. It can refer to a set of rules for classifying or  
communicating information: the metric system, the Linnaean classification 
system, a system of notation, or a system of signaling. 
The last several types of systems have something in common with 
games. As Professor Jesper Juul has argued, games are more than just  
systems, broadly defined; they are what computer scientists call a “state 
machine.”94 “Briefly stated, a state machine is a machine that has an initial 
state, accepts a specific amount of input events, changes state in response to 
inputs using a state transition function (i.e., rules), and produces specific 
outputs using an output function.”95 Games perform all of these functions, 
according to their rules. The initial state of the game is specified by the 
rules as a particular arrangement of board and pieces, players and field, or 
deck of cards. The rules also define a set of permissible inputs: moves or 
plays.96 The game changes state as a result of those inputs, again in ways 
defined by the rules. For example, when a player in tic-tac-toe moves by 
marking an “X,” the rules provide that the game state changes in a  
particular way: an “X” is placed on the grid, and it becomes the second 
player’s turn.97 Finally, games provide outputs back to the players about 
how the game state is changed. In a simple game like tic-tac-toe, the state of 
the game is fully revealed to both players, but in other games, such as  
poker, the players may be given more limited information. 
Games are thus a means of transforming a large but constrained set of 
inputs into a correlated and defined set of outputs. That is, for each input X 
in the proper form entered in state S, a game, via its rules, will produce a 
designated output Y and a transition to state S1. While there are a large 
number of possible inputs to choose from, each input will, given the state 
the game is in, produce a determinate output. As it turns out, games share 
this feature with many of the types of “systems” listed above. A system of 
notation is a means of coding or transcoding words or other elements of 
language: for example, a shorthand system will identify one, and only one,98 
correct way of transcribing a particular word. The metric system transforms 
  
 94 See JUUL, supra note 67, at 60. For an explanation of state machines in computer science, see 
BRAN SELIC, GARTH GULLEKSON & PAUL T. WARD, REAL-TIME OBJECT-ORIENTED MODELING § 8.2.1 
(1994). 
 95 JUUL, supra note 67, at 60. 
 96 See id. at 63. 
 97 See id. at 60 (“When you play a game, you are interacting with the state machine that is the 
game. In a board game, this state is stored in the position of the pieces on the board; in sports, the game 
state is the score and the players; in computer-based games, the state is stored in memory and then 
represented on screen.”). 
 98 Some words may have alternative notations, just as there are alternative spellings in ordinary 
language. However, if there are too many alternative spellings, the system will break down. 
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a variety of measurements of certain quantities into a prescribed number of 
units of different types (e.g., meters for length, kilograms for weight, etc.). 
A betting system uses rules to match information about the cards in play to 
particular wagers. A judicial system uses laws and procedures to transform 
disputes into binding resolutions. A physical system follows the laws of 
physics in turning an initial state into subsequent states. 
In other words, a system is a mechanism or set of rules for  
transforming a given range of inputs into particular outputs. It is, in  
essence, a type of look-up table. Provided with a certain input from a range 
of possible inputs, the look-up table provides a particular response, one that 
transforms the input in some way. It correlates information or actions on the 
one side to corresponding information or actions on the other. But we have 
not answered the question of whether that explains why games are not  
copyrightable until we figure out whether that type of system is the sort that 
copyright law excludes. So, what sorts of systems are uncopyrightable?  
III. WHAT COPYRIGHT LAW SAYS ABOUT SYSTEMS 
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act bars copyright from extending to 
“any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,  
principle, or discovery.”99 Most courts and scholars have located the basis 
for the exclusion of games in § 102(b), if not in its literal terms, then at least 
somewhere in its penumbra. Section 102(b) is therefore the logical starting 
point for determining what categories of material are excluded from  
copyrightable material. This Part will begin by examining post-1978 case 
law interpreting the scope of § 102(b). This Part then examines the text of 
the statute itself in light of its legislative history. Finally, this Part looks to 
pre-1978 cases involving “systems” to glean the meaning of that term in 
particular. 
A. Current Case Law on “Systems” 
The initial difficulty with divining the meaning of any of the terms in 
§ 102(b) is that court interpretation of that provision is in a severe state of 
disarray. Like games, § 102(b) is ill-understood and has not been the focus 
of much rigorous scholarly or judicial analysis.100 Indeed, many courts 
  
 99 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 100 At least, not until very recently. Pamela Samuelson has attempted to rectify this problem with 
an article devoted specifically to determining the purpose and extent of the exclusions contained in 
§ 102(b). See Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1923; see also Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in 
Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193, 195-96 (2007) (arguing that coding standards are uncopyrightable 
systems). There is some indication that her effort to recover the lost meaning of § 102(b) is already 
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simply ignore the text of § 102(b) altogether. That is, several courts have 
decided to simplify their interpretive task by reading § 102(b) as simply 
codifying the idea/expression dichotomy. Many of the modern cases  
involve numbering schemes for parts or services. For example, the Eighth 
Circuit in Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co.101 rejected a claim of copyright 
over the numbering system for lawnmower parts, but not because of 
§ 102(b).102 The Toro court dismissed the district court’s attempt to exclude 
the parts numbers as a “system.”103 Such a “literal application of the  
section’s language,” the court held, “cannot stand.”104 Instead, the Toro 
court read § 102(b) as “nothing more than a codification of the 
idea/expression dichotomy.”105 A sufficiently creative system would be 
copyrightable, the court concluded.106 The problem with the Toro parts 
numbers, according to the Eighth Circuit, was that they were randomly  
assigned and thus lacked the necessary creativity.107 
Several courts have followed Toro’s holding that § 102(b) does  
nothing other than codify the idea/expression dichotomy. For example, the 
Tenth Circuit has held that § 102(b) requires no more than filtering out  
abstract ideas.108 According to another panel of the same court, protectable 
expression contained within a system or method of operation does not need 
  
paying dividends. See R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1144 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1923, 1944-52). 
 101 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986). The Toro opinion was written by a senior Second Circuit judge, 
Judge Timbers, sitting by designation. See id. at 1209 n.*. 
 102 Id. at 1212. 
 103 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 1211. The Toro court relied in part on the legislative history of the 1976 Act for this 
conclusion. See id. at 1211-12 (“Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright 
protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate . . . that the basic dichotomy between expres-
sion and idea remains unchanged.” (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As noted earlier, 
however, “idea” is often used in copyright law as a general term meaning all material uncopyrightable 
under one of the § 102(b) exclusions. Evidence that Congress was using the word in this broad sense can 
be found elsewhere on the same page of the legislative history, where Congress made clear that one 
intent behind § 102(b) was “to make clear . . . that the actual processes or methods embodied in [a 
computer] program are not within the scope of the copyright law.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670. 
The Toro court likely drew its understanding of § 102(b) from the Nimmer treatise, which was 
edited by Melville B. Nimmer until his death in 1985. Nimmer had a dim view of categorical exceptions 
to copyright, and he believed that Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), had been sharply limited by 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). See Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1956. Despite the seeming breadth 
of the exclusions in § 102(b), Nimmer read it as only denying copyright in abstract ideas. See id. at 
1953. 
 106 See Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213 (“A system that uses symbols in some sort of meaningful pattern, 
something by which one could distinguish effort or content, would be an original work.”). 
 107 See id. 
 108 See Autoskill Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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to be excluded under § 102(b).109 And although the Third Circuit has never 
ruled directly on the question, a number of its judges appear to agree that 
creative systems are copyrightable and that the only inquiry under § 102(b) 
is whether the work has unprotectable ideas.110 
The result of these cases is that many courts read the eight terms in 
§ 102(b)—idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery—as essentially eight instances of the word “idea.” 
This would make § 102(b) an even more redundant list than the order for 
six fish in a famous Sesame Street skit: “Fish, fish, fish, fish, fish, fish.”111 
And it has generated a welter of confusing opinions, as courts have  
attempted to fit uncopyrightable systems or processes under other types of 
exclusions, such as ideas, scènes à faire, or lack of creativity. 
However, the solution is not as simple as recognizing that § 102(b) 
contains eight different terms. Even those courts that have taken the text of 
§ 102(b) seriously have had difficulty interpreting it. For example, the  
Eleventh Circuit, noting that “copyright law is principally statutory,” 
looked to the text of § 102(b) as a source of exceptions in Warren  
Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.112 There, the district court, which 
had found the plaintiff’s work to be copyrightable, made matters easier by 
explicitly identifying it as a “system.”113 The Warren Publishing court  
explained that while merely calling something a “system” doesn’t make it 
uncopyrightable, it does “if the characterization is accurate.”114 But the 
court then punted on the ultimate question of whether the work in suit was 
  
 109 Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with the First Cir-
cuit’s exclusion of methods of operation in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 
49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996)). It 
is worth noting that the Tenth Circuit is fractured on this issue. Although Autoskill and Mitel followed 
Toro, other panels of the Tenth Circuit have held that functional material such as processes or systems 
are properly excluded under § 102(b), apparently ignoring intra-circuit precedent. See, e.g., R.W. Beck, 
Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 2009); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando 
Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993).  
 110 See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Becker, 
J., concurring) (distinguishing American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th 
Cir. 1997), because there the numbering system was creative); id. at 294 (Roth, J., dissenting) (suggest-
ing that the only basis for exclusion is as an idea). 
 111 See Steven Strogatz, From Fish to Infinity, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Jan. 31, 2010, 9:30 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/from-fish-to-infinity (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 112 115 F.3d 1509, 1514 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 
807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (excluding menu commands as a “method of operation” under § 102(b) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  
 113 See Warren, 115 F.3d at 1516. The plaintiff’s work was a catalog of cable systems, indexed by 
the “principal community” they served, which was evidently a novel and useful way to organize such 
listings. Id. at 1511-12, 1516. 
 114 Id. at 1514 n.13. 
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in fact a “system,” finding alternative grounds on which to base its  
opinion.115  
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has been particularly active in excluding 
functional aspects of expression from copyright protection.116 However, it 
too has had difficulty determining the precise meaning of each of the eight 
terms in § 102(b). In Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp.,117 
the court held that a book of recipes was not protectable expression, but it 
was unclear why, calling the recipes alternately a “procedure, process, [or] 
system,” or perhaps an idea.118 In American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental 
Plans Ass’n,119 the Seventh Circuit grappled with whether a code of dental 
procedures constituted a “system.”120 Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for 
the court, began by asking: “[W]hat could it mean to call the Code a  
‘system’?”121 As its only answer to that question, the American Dental 
Ass’n court noted that the code “does not come with instructions for use, as 
if the Code were a recipe for a new dish,” nor did it “facilitate monopoly of 
the subject-matter being described.”122 Implicitly, the court thus held that 
instructions or monopolization of a practical endeavor are the hallmarks of 
a system, but it did not positively define “system.”123 
In fact, no modern case defines precisely what is meant by the term 
“system” in § 102(b) or indicates how a “system” might differ from a 
“process,” “procedure,” or “method of operation.” Since Congress intended 
only to codify existing law in § 102(b), it is worthwhile to revisit older  
cases involving systems to determine what it was that was being excluded 
and to compare those systems to games. 
  
 115 Specifically, the court held that Warren’s list of community cable systems lacked originality 
because Warren attempted to list every community, without making any selection. Id. at 1517-19. War-
ren then identified “principal communities” by contacting each cable operator and collecting that infor-
mation from them. See id. at 1519-20. 
 116 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 3:33, at 3-64 (2009). 
 117 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 118 See id. at 481 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 119 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 120 See id. at 977. 
 121 Id. at 980. Delta Dental’s brief had not shed much light on this issue, noting only that the ADA 
had itself described the Code as a “system” and analogizing the Code to the Bluebook, which Delta 
Dental claimed was uncopyrightable. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee Delta Dental Plans Ass’n at 51-
55, American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-4140). 
 122 Id. at 980-81. 
 123 Similarly, the Second Circuit rejected the idea that a form listing nine categories to track in 
judging pitching performance were a “system”: “Kregos has not devised a system . . . . He does not 
present his selection of nine statistics as a method of predicting the outcome of baseball games.” Kregos 
v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 706 (2d Cir. 1991). The Kregos court thus seems to have concluded 
that “systems” are only things that issue predictions; forms that direct users to fill in selected types of 
facts for use in making their own judgments or predictions are not “systems.” 
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B. The Origins of the Exclusion 
Section 102(b) had its origins in a long line of cases dating back to at 
least the Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in Baker v. Selden.124 A number of 
those cases, including Baker itself, involved what were described as  
“systems,” which the courts held uncopyrightable. The “systems” in those 
cases bear considerable resemblance to “state machines”: they are means 
for transforming inputted information into a different form. The history 
behind the exclusion of “systems” in § 102(b) thus confirms that games are 
“systems” as that term is defined in copyright law. 
Baker v. Selden arose out of Charles Selden’s attempt to obtain  
copyright protection for his system for double-entry bookkeeping.125 He 
wrote a book in 1859 explaining his system, which contained in it a number 
of blank forms to be used in conjunction with the system.126 W.C.M. Baker, 
another bookkeeper from Ohio, published his own book in 1867, setting 
forth a similar, but not exactly identical, system, using similar forms.127 The 
Supreme Court held that Selden’s copyright in his book did not extend to 
his system.128 Selden’s copyright gave him the exclusive right to his  
explanation of his system, but he could not prevent anyone from using the 
system itself; that was the exclusive domain of patent law.129 And to the 
extent that forms similar to Selden’s were needed in order to use his system, 
Selden could not prevent the copying of those either.130 
Selden’s system allowed an auditor for a county government to track 
various accounts on a single page. An auditor, that is, would input financial 
transactions of various types, and by using the system and accompanying 
forms, that information would be transformed so that it was displayed back 
to the auditor in a comprehensible way.131 In other words, Selden’s system 
acted like a “state machine,” just like games do. 
  
 124 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 125 See id. at 99-100. For excellent background on the case, see Pamela Samuelson, The Story of 
Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY STORIES 159, 159-65 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). A number 
of scholars have expounded on Baker’s holding. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1928-36; Lloyd 
L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1171-76 (1998). 
 126 Baker, 101 U.S. at 99-100. 
 127 Samuelson, supra note 125, at 161. 
 128 Baker, 101 U.S. at 107. 
 129 Id. at 101-02. 
 130 Id. at 103 (“And where the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and 
diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be 
considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public; not given for the purpose 
of publication in other works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical application.”). 
 131 Unfortunately for Selden, it appears that Baker’s system was even better at this than his was. 
See Samuelson, supra note 125, at 161-62. 
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Several post-Baker cases involved similar systems. For example, a 
number of cases denied copyrights in systems for the presentation of  
information, which was the sort of system involved in Baker. In Aldrich v.  
Remington Rand, Inc.,132 the plaintiff sold a “Tax Record System” to local 
governments for performing property revaluations for tax purposes,  
including sample forms for use with the system.133 The court denied  
Aldrich’s claim that the defendants infringed his work by using some of the 
forms.134 In Burnell v. Chown,135 the plaintiff, in essence, devised a system 
to produce credit reports, using a key of five different letters to denote  
creditworthiness.136 The court held that a competitor who used a similar 
system, with similar symbols, had not infringed.137 “The most that can be 
claimed on behalf of the plaintiff is that the defendant has appropriated his 
scheme, device, conception, and idea for gathering and imparting this  
particular information.”138 As the Second Circuit declared in another case, 
these cases hold that the copyright owner “has no monopoly upon  
information, or the purveying of information by a broad general method.”139 
Similarly, copyright protection does not extend to systems that are  
expressly designed to allow others to organize information. For example, in 
Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith & Co.,140 the plaintiff devised 
“Amberg’s Directory System of Indexing,” which was essentially “a  
mechanism or device for the storage of letters so that they can be preserved 
and conveniently found afterward.”141 The court found the indexing system 
uncopyrightable because “[u]ntil the purchaser of a set of these ‘indexes’ 
commences to use the same, by putting written documents between the 
leaves, such indexes signify nothing.”142 Along the same lines are the blank 
forms cases: blank graph paper for temperature recording devices and  
blank to-do lists for use with personal organization systems are not  
copyrightable.143 
  
 132 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942). 
 133 Id. at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134 See id. 
 135 69 F. 993 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1895). 
 136 See id. at 993. 
 137 Id. at 997-98. 
 138 Id. at 997. 
 139 Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1929) (ruling that condensed freight tariff indexes 
were not infringed by similar indexes). 
 140 78 F. 479 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1896), aff’d, 82 F. 314 (7th Cir. 1897). 
 141 Id. at 479-80. 
 142 Id. at 480. 
 143 See Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (finding that 
blank charts for use in temperature and pressure recording devices were not copyrightable); Taylor 
Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99-100 (7th Cir. 1943) (finding that blank charts for 
use in temperature recording devices were not copyrightable); Januz Mktg. Commc’ns v. Doubleday & 
Co., 569 F. Supp. 76, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that blank forms for maintaining to-do lists were not 
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Courts have also held systems of notation to be uncopyrightable. In 
Perris v. Hexamer,144 the Supreme Court held that the author of a  
copyrighted map could not prevent the makers of other maps from using the 
same symbols to denote various features.145 In Brief English Systems, Inc. v. 
Owen,146 the plaintiff owned the copyright in several books and pamphlets 
setting forth “The Steno-Short-Type System,” which was “a system of 
shorthand which uses for its symbols or characters only the letters of the 
English alphabet and punctuation marks.”147 The defendant published a 
book that taught a similar system.148 The Second Circuit held that “[t]here is 
no literary merit in a mere system of condensing written words into less 
than the number of letters usually used to spell them out. Copyrightable 
material is found, if at all, in the explanation of how to do it.”149 In  
Freedman v. Grolier Enterprises, Inc.,150 the plaintiff claimed ownership 
over a notation system for evaluating hands in bridge, which he claimed 
was infringed by the defendants’ cards.151 The court held that the notation 
system was an idea and that putting the values on the cards was the only 
way of expressing it.152 
Although not always designated as “systems,” courts have excluded 
business and government plans from copyrightability as well. In Long v. 
Jordan,153 the plaintiff claimed that his copyrighted description of a system 
for paying out pensions—the “Ray System”—was infringed by a California 
initiative that sought to establish such a system.154 The Ray System involved 
placing redemption stamps on the back of a card as each payment was 
made.155 Long sought to enjoin the state government from printing and  
distributing the text of the proposed constitutional amendment.156 The court 
rejected the claim, holding that “a copyright on an exposition of a system of 
government cannot prevent the use of that system as intended.”157 In Conti-
  
copyrightable). The Taylor Instrument court held that the charts in that case “neither teaches nor ex-
plains the use of the art. It is an essential element of the machine; it is the art itself.” 139 F.2d at 100. 
 144 99 U.S. 674 (1878). 
 145 See id. at 676. 
 146 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1931). 
 147 Id. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148 Id. at 556. 
 149 Id.; see also Griggs v. Perrin, 49 F. 15, 15-16 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1892) (ruling that there was no 
copyright in a system of stenography). 
 150 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 495 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir. 1974) (unpublished 
table decision). 
 151 Id. at 477. 
 152 Id. at 478. 
 153 29 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1939). 
 154 Id. at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 155 Id. at 288. 
 156 Id. at 287. 
 157 Id. at 290. 
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nental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley,158 Beardsley authored a pamphlet setting 
forth the “Beardsley Plan,” which enabled corporations to insure against the 
loss of stock certificates, including the necessary forms.159 Continental, a 
competitor, obtained a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to use the 
form “for the function for which it was designed.”160 Crume v. Pacific  
Mutual Life Insurance Co.161 involved a plan for reorganizing a bankrupt 
insurance company.162 The plaintiff claimed that an agreement published by 
the defendant (and apparently required by the California Insurance  
Commissioner) infringed on his plan.163 The court dismissed the claim.164 
Courts have also excluded contests and betting systems from copyright 
protection. Briggs v. New Hampshire Trotting & Breeding Ass’n165 involved 
the plaintiff’s brochure describing “a betting system whereby patrons  
selected winning horses for each of the seven consecutive races, from the 
second through the eighth race.”166 The winnings were distributed among 
those who got the most right, as determined by IBM adding machines.167 
The court dismissed the action, citing the rule against protection of “sports, 
games, or similar systems.”168 Other courts have refused to extend copyright 
in the description of a contest or quiz show to contests or quiz shows using 
the same format.169 
In all of these situations, the owners of a copyright in a form, descrip-
tion, or set of instructions were attempting to extend their copyright to  
material for which the user of the work provided the essential content, not 
its author. That is what made them systems. They were, without that input, 
empty shells, waiting to be filled. Selden’s system conveyed nothing about 
the finances of a county government until it was filled in. The Amberg  
  
 158 151 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), modified and aff’d, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 159 Id. at 30-31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160 See id. at 33, 45. 
 161 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944). 
 162 Id. at 182-83. 
 163 Id. at 183. 
 164 See id. at 184-85. Similarly, advertising formats have also been denied protection, usually being 
described as methods. See Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchs.’ Ass’n, 64 F.2d 575, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1933) 
(stating that a “system or method” of selling stationery was not copyrightable); Gaye v. Gillis, 167 F. 
Supp. 416, 417-18 (D. Mass. 1958) (denying copyright protection for blank coupons to sell dunning 
services); S. S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley, 38 F. 751, 752 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889) (stating that a “plan of 
advertising” artificial teeth through a numbered chart was not copyrightable); Ehret v. Pierce, 10 F. 553, 
553, 555 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1880) (denying copyright protection for a sample card of paint chips).  
 165 191 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.H. 1960). 
 166 Id. at 235. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 236-37. 
 169 See Richards v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 161 F. Supp. 516, 518 (D.D.C. 1958) (holding that 
the format for a quiz show was not protected); Lewis v. Kroger Co., 109 F. Supp. 484, 485, 487 (S.D. 
W. Va. 1952) (finding that the plaintiff’s copyright in a description of a newspaper contest could not 
prevent the defendants from running similar contests). 
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index was a series of empty folders until it actually had something to index. 
Burnell’s credit reporting system reported on nothing until credit histories 
were added. The Steno-Short-Type System stood by mute until there was a 
speech or deposition to transcribe. The Briggs betting system needed  
bettors and horse races to be implemented. All of that content was supplied 
during the use of the system, not by the system itself. 
Games are systems in exactly the same way. A game, as sold, is only a 
game form; the content necessary for an instance of the game comes from 
the players. That is, the game form establishes the environment for play—
the game space—and it defines permissible moves and the conditions for 
winning or drawing. But the game itself is supplied by the players. Games 
are systems in the same way that the excluded schemes in the cases above 
were systems, and it was that history that Congress drew upon in adopting 
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act. 
There is still an unresolved question, however. Games are systems, but 
they also produce entertainment, just like other copyrightable works.  
Indeed, the Third Circuit and other courts have suggested that there may be 
such things as copyrightable systems.170 Determining whether games are 
copyrightable thus requires tracing the boundaries of the § 102(b)  
exclusion. 
C. “Systems,” “Processes,” and “Ideas” in § 102(b) 
The games literature suggests that games are systems—in particular, a 
type of system known as a “state machine”—and the history of copyright 
law supports this conclusion. With this step in the argument behind us, it is 
worth returning to § 102(b) to determine to what extent systems can be  
distinguished from, on the one hand, the other exclusions in § 102(b), and 
on the other, copyrightable expression. It turns out that the exclusion of 
“systems” in § 102(b), as exemplified by games, performs a function that 
none of the other excluded categories perform; but the distinction between 
systems and expression is surprisingly difficult. 
Section 102(b) bars copyright in “any idea, procedure, process,  
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”171 Congress 
added it to the Copyright Act of 1976, as the legislative history states,  
in order to codify existing law, not to create new exclusions to  
copyrightability.172 The exceptions listed in § 102(b) fall into at least two 
  
 170 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 171 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 172 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976) (stating that § 102(b) was intended “to restate, in the 
context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and 
idea remains unchanged”), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670. As Samuelson notes, “[t]he 
legislative history does not reveal why these specific words of exclusion were chosen for § 102(b), 
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general categories: discerning between the specific expression of an idea 
and more abstract and general descriptions of the same (i.e., ideas,  
concepts, and principles); and distinguishing between copyrightable  
expression and useful practices (i.e., procedures, processes, systems,  
methods of operation, and discoveries). In other words, § 102(b) codifies 
the idea/expression dichotomy and the boundary between copyrightable and 
patentable subject matter.173 
The first problem with trying to analyze whether games fall under 
§ 102(b) is that the precise meanings of the eight terms in § 102(b) are  
obscure. Several of the terms seem synonymous. This is particularly true 
for the first word in the list, “idea,” which is sometimes used as a catch-all 
term for all eight of the exclusions in § 102(b).174 But it is also unclear  
exactly how “ideas” are distinct from “concepts” and “principles.” The  
dictionary definition of “idea” includes both “concepts” and “principles,” 
and copyright law often uses the term “idea” to mean any general statement 
or abstract truth. But “idea” is also often used in a narrower sense in  
copyright law to mean a highly generalized summary of a copyrighted work 
that captures the underlying thought being expressed.175 As for “principle,” 
the legislative history of § 102(b) sheds some light on what Congress’s 
concerns may have been. Early reports indicate that Congress was  
concerned that “mathematical principles” would not be copyrightable.176 
Presumably, the § 102(b) exclusion for “principles” reflects that concern, 
and also probably encompasses scientific principles as well: rule-like 
statements about the fundamental properties of nature and mathematics, no 
matter how detailed.177 The meaning of “concept” is unclear, but it could be 
  
although all but two had been explicitly mentioned during the legislative debate.” Samuelson, supra 
note 8, at 1951. 
 173 Section 102(b) may also include the fact/expression dichotomy, through its reference to “dis-
cover[ies].” See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  
 174 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1952 (noting the use of “[i]dea” in legislative history to 
mean all of § 102(b)’s exclusions (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 175 The legislative history indicates concern that such summaries not be included as copyrightable 
subject matter. Early in the revision effort, a key report specifically identified “plans,” “formats and 
synopses of television series and the like,” and “color schemes” as unprotectable. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-
2237, at 43-44 & 44 n.1 (1966), reprinted in 11 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
(George S. Grossman ed., 2001). For example, Gene Roddenberry evidently sold Star Trek to NBC by 
describing it as “‘Wagon Train’ to the stars”—that is, it would be a series that, like Wagon Train, fea-
tured the adventures of a single set of characters in a different location every week. E.g., Iain Blair, 
Trek’s a Treat: Why Starship Enterprise Crew Stays Together, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1986, at L24 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). That synopsis of Star Trek is not itself protectable under copyright law—in 
other words, the Star Trek copyright does not extend to prevent all other science fiction television shows 
from using the same format. 
 176 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 43-44 & 44 n.1, reprinted in 11 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 175. 
 177 See id. 
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a variant of “principle,” such as a theory that has not yet been  
well-established enough to be a “principle.” 
Some cases appear to hold that games or game rules are  
uncopyrightable under one of these three exceptions because they are  
abstract. However, none of the three exceptions applies. Games and game 
rules are not “ideas” in the narrow sense; they are not general synopses of 
some larger, more detailed work. And although game rules might bear some 
superficial resemblance to the laws of nature or mathematics, they are not 
“principles,” in that game rules are completely synthetic and arbitrary. The 
purpose of keeping scientific laws and mathematical equations or proofs 
uncopyrightable is that they express truths about the world that, like facts, 
are essential building blocks for knowledge. Game rules have no such  
relationship to truth; they are manufactured out of whole cloth with the sole 
objective of producing entertainment, the same as any other art form. 
Thus, if games are uncopyrightable under one of the existing  
exclusions in § 102(b),178 it is because they are procedures, processes,  
systems, methods of operation, or discoveries. The last of these exclusions 
can be quickly eliminated: under either of the possible definitions of  
“discovery,” it is clear that games are not discoveries.179 Less clear is 
whether games might be procedures, processes, or methods of operation. 
Although § 102(b) is said to delineate the boundary between patent and 
copyright, the terms used are evidently not borrowed directly from patent 
law. Patent law has long categorized inventions into four primary types: 
machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, and processes.180 Sec-
tion 102(b), on the other hand, uses three terms that are all interchangeable 
under patent law (i.e., processes, procedures, and methods), another term 
that originally encompassed all patentable inventions of any type (i.e., dis-
coveries), and finally a term that doesn’t seem to directly correspond to any 
  
 178 As Samuelson notes, it is not clear whether § 102(b) was intended to be an exhaustive list of 
exclusions from copyrightability, or merely an illustrative one. See Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1921 
n.4. Commentators have gone both ways. See, e.g., William F. Patry, Copyright and Computer Pro-
grams: It’s All in the Definition, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 36-37 (1996) (exhaustive); Robert L. 
Bocchino Jr., Note, Computers, Copyright, and Functionality: The First Circuit’s Decision in Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467, 477 (1996) (illustrative). 
If illustrative, it is possible that games fit within some unlisted exception to copyrightability. Samuelson 
herself concludes that even if games do not fall within one of the specified exclusions in § 102(b), the 
case law “is consistent with” the system, method, or process exclusions. Samuelson, supra note 8, at 
1944. Given the conclusion of this Article that games are uncopyrightable systems, it is unnecessary to 
resolve this issue here. 
 179 Games are not facts, or necessarily fact-based, thus ruling out the more modern meaning of 
discovery; nor are games necessarily one of the types of inventions not listed elsewhere in § 102(b): 
machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 180 See id. 
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type of invention (i.e., systems).181 It seems clear that to the extent § 102(b) 
codifies the boundary between copyright and patent, it does so in terms that 
draw their meaning from somewhere other than patent law.182 
Even if the § 102(b) exceptions are read as ordinary words, rather than 
patent terms of art, the precise exceptions are still difficult to distinguish 
from each other. The ordinary dictionary definitions of “procedures” and 
“processes” are fairly close. However, there is a slight difference: a  
“procedure” connotes a series of steps to be undertaken by a human being 
following instructions, whereas a “process” can be something automated or 
naturally occurring.183 Section 102(b) also bars copyright in “method[s] of 
operation,”184 presumably methods of operating a machine or device.  
Although some games, such as computer games and some board games, 
involve something that might be described as a machine, it is hardly the 
case that all games involve machinery. Furthermore, even where a machine 
is involved, game rules do much more than instruct the player how to  
operate a machine; they also define legal moves and conditions of  
victory.185 The bar against “methods of operation” would therefore not  
justify a prohibition on all copyright in games. 
However, because games are comprised of rules—that is, instruc-
tions—it might seem more plausible that they are uncopyrightable 
processes or procedures. A “process” in patent law is a series of steps to 
accomplish a certain result.186 Games might be thought of as such 
“processes,” namely, a series of steps necessary to produce entertainment 
for the players.187 But there are two problems with this hypothesis. First, 
  
 181 Some patent cases involve what are described as “systems,” which typically refers to processes 
implemented in software on a machine. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 83, § 18.07[6][c][iv], at 18-1570  
to -1572. 
 182 “Systems,” in the sense of state machines, are probably patentable as an element of a process, as 
that term—a series of steps producing a useful result—is used in patent law. See NTP, Inc. v. Research 
in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Interacting with the system might be one step in 
the process, just like use of a machine might be a step in a process. But that does not mean that systems 
or machines are processes, or tell us what sorts of things are excluded by the use of the term “system” in 
copyright law. 
 183 See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1072 (3d coll. ed. 1988) 
(defining procedure as “the sequence of steps to be followed” and process as “a continuing development 
involving many changes”). 
 184 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 185 But see Jeffrey v. Cannon Films Inc., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1373, 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (find-
ing that rules for an arm wrestling tournament were a method of operation). 
 186 See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1318. 
 187 It might also be thought that game rules identify a series of steps necessary to play the game, or 
perhaps to win. But if it is a necessary element for a process that it be directed at achieving some result, 
neither playing the game nor winning would seem to satisfy that condition. Playing the game is merely 
making moves permitted by the rules—in other words, following the steps identified by the process. 
Following the process cannot be the “result” that is achieved by following the process—that would be 
circular. “Winning” might seem more tangible, except that winning is defined by the game rules them-
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thinking of a game as a process relies on too facile an analogy between 
game rules and instructions. As discussed above,188 the rules of a game are 
not instructions for play in the same way that recipes are instructions for 
making a cake; they do not fully specify what occurs during play. Game 
rules are thus not a “process” or “procedure” for carrying on a game.  
Consider the game Scrabble. The rules provide the initial state of the game: 
two or more players, seven tiles per player randomly drawn from the fixed 
set of 100 tiles, and a procedure to determine who goes first. The rules then 
state that it is the first player’s turn, and they place some boundary  
constraints on what the player may do (e.g., he or she must place a word on 
the center square and may only use ordinary English words). But within 
those very broad constraints, the rules do not specify at all what word the 
player should put down. He or she is free to put down “it” or “tea” or “hate” 
or “tithe,” all from the same draw of seven tiles. The second player has 
even more freedom. If a computer were executing the Scrabble “process,” it 
would grind to a halt without further input. 
Thus, although games have rules or instructions, those instructions do 
not provide a “series of steps” for the player to follow. Rather, they set  
limits on player actions, and they define what is inside those limits as  
permissible moves. That is, they establish the game-space, or “magic  
circle,” but they do not tell the player what to do inside of it. Indeed,  
exploring that space, by making moves in the game, is what it means to 
“play” the game.189 The fewer options a player has, the less game-like a 
given activity becomes. 
But there is an even deeper problem with classifying games as 
processes, one that points to a fundamental difficulty with all of the 
§ 102(b) patentability exclusions. If “process” is broad enough to encom-
pass games as methods of producing entertainment, then that exception 
would swallow forms of works that are clearly copyrightable. Two vener-
able forms of copyrighted works come in the form of instructions: sheet 
music and scripts for plays.190 The notes, lyrics, and other notations on sheet 
music instruct musicians how to play the composition; a script instructs 
actors how to perform a play, giving them their lines and stage directions.191 
  
selves. The game would then be a process for achieving an arbitrary result defined by the process itself. 
As both of these examples show, the end-state of the process must be defined in terms of some result 
external to the game in order for it to be a patentable process. 
 188 See supra Part II.A. 
 189 See JUUL, supra note 67, at 63. 
 190 Copies of sound recordings and audiovisual works similarly carry instructions for appropriate 
playback devices. 
 191 It is true that sheet music or a script does not tell the performers absolutely everything they need 
to know to play a piece. Sheet music does not tell a trumpet player how to sound the various notes, how 
to play staccato or glissando, how fast molto allegro is, or precisely how softly to play at any given 
moment. But recipes contain similar lacunae—what is a “pinch”? How does one “fold,” or “whip”? 
What are chives? See 1 DONALD E. KNUTH, THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING 6 (3d ed. 2d prtg. 
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If that is the case, then why are music and plays copyrightable? Even the 
terminology used to describe all three activities indicates similarity. Games, 
music, and dramatic works are all “played” by “players” who follow the 
instructions they are given. The Copyright Act clearly recognizes the play 
of music or a script as within the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights—the right of public performance.192 Yet there is no general rule that 
music is not copyrightable or that plays are not copyrightable. 
Copyright scholars have addressed this puzzle, to the extent they have 
addressed it at all, by adding a hidden distinction to § 102(b) that performs 
the work of distinguishing between copyrightable and uncopyrightable 
processes: § 102(b) bars copyright in processes that are purely functional. 
As Professor Dennis S. Karjala has described the dividing line: 
Information is the subject matter of copyright—works that have no function other than to in-
form, entertain, or present an appearance to human beings. Function is the subject matter of 
patent—works that do have a function beyond informing, entertaining, or presenting an ap-
pearance to human beings, including methodologies for gathering, organizing, and presenting 
information accurately and efficiently.193 
That is, § 102(b) excludes a work based on its function. Works that convey 
information—in the form of education, entertainment, or aesthetics—are 
within the domain of copyright. Works that perform any other function are 
excluded. 
By that logic, it appears as though games are not uncopyrightable after 
all. Although games are systems, they, like music and plays, have the  
function of entertaining their users. That is, games are systems that  
entertain, just like sheet music is a process that entertains. That would yield 
some unexpected results. If games are copyrightable just like music and 
plays, then that would mean that a public performance of the game—for 
example, playing the game in public—would infringe on the copyright. 
Playing chess in the park would be permissible, but only because chess is in 
the public domain. Playing Scrabble in the park would not be.194 
It turns out that the distinction drawn between copyrightable and  
uncopyrightable processes and systems is not quite adequate. Focusing on 
what it would mean to “perform” a game helps demonstrate where the line 
should be. 
  
1997). Yet a recipe is widely recognized to be a procedure or process. See, e.g., Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. 
Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 192 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006). 
 193 Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 
524 (2003). 
 194 Unless Scrabble has lost its copyright. See Bruce Boyden, Thoughts on the Scrabulous Lawsuit, 
Part II: The Mystery of Alfred Mosher Butts, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 4, 2008, 12:43 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/08/thoughts-on-t-1.html (concluding that Scrabble’s 
author may have failed to comply with the 1909 Act’s notice requirement). 
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IV. PERFORMANCE AND PLAY 
Part III concluded that games are systems, but that that alone is not 
enough to say that they are uncopyrightable. Music and plays are  
copyrightable processes, and games, music, and plays all bear some  
resemblance to each other. They can all be “played” by “players” following 
their instructions or rules. They are all conveyed by either processes or  
systems, the sole function of which, in each case, is to produce entertain-
ment. Nevertheless, the traditional rule is that games are not copyrightable, 
while music and plays are. The reason is that the nature of the transmission 
of information from creator to audience is importantly different in a game 
as compared to music and plays. The copyrightable expression of a game 
does not extend to the gaming experience in the same way expression 
reaches the core of the musical or play-watching experience. 
Understanding the difference between games and other media requires 
tracing that experience back to its source. That is, it requires a close  
examination of the difference between playing a game and playing a song 
or other copyrighted work. While playing a musical composition is a per-
formance of that song, playing a game is not a “performance” of the game, 
even though the similar terminology would suggest that it is. The reason for 
this, however, remains unclear in the cases and the copyright literature.195 
Most of the cases involving non-electronic games have involved suits 
against the creators of competing works for infringement of the reproduc-
tion right.196 However, at least a few courts have had occasion to consider 
whether playing a copyrighted game is a “performance” of the game. If so, 
then playing such a game in public without authorization from the owner 
would infringe on the owner’s copyright,197 unless the player had a valid 
fair use defense.198 The idea seems on its face implausible, and it received 
  
 195 Lloyd L. Weinreb has suggested that the reason is mere path dependence: books and plays have 
traditionally been held to be copyrightable, and games and other materials have traditionally been held 
to be uncopyrightable. See Weinreb, supra note 125, at 1204-05. Although Weinreb’s insight is impor-
tant in understanding modern copyright law, as this Article argues in Part IV, there is a deep doctrinal 
distinction at work here. 
 196 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (granting the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce the 
work). The other exclusive rights of a copyright owner under the current Act are to prepare derivative 
works, to distribute copies of the work to the public, to publicly perform the work (by means of digital 
audio transmission or otherwise), and to publicly display the work. Id. § 106(2)-(6). 
 197 The display of the copyrighted pictorial or graphic elements of the game would not constitute 
an infringing public display of the work because of the “first sale” doctrine. See id. § 109(c) (“[T]he 
owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is 
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly . . . to viewers 
present at the place where the copy is located.”). While the first sale doctrine also applies to distribution, 
allowing the owner of a copy to transfer it to someone else, it does not apply to performance. See id. 
§ 109(a). 
 198 See id. § 107. 
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little attention before it arose with respect to video games.199 In Seltzer v. 
Sunbrock, for example, Seltzer, the plaintiff, attempted to claim that the 
defendants’ roller derbies were infringing public performances of the work 
contained in Seltzer’s somewhat fictionalized version200 of the rules for his 
roller derbies.201 The court rejected this claim for a number of reasons, 
among them that the running of a race in accordance with a set of rules is 
not a dramatic performance: “The mere fact that the race as staged is  
entertaining or thrilling or arouses great excitement cannot in itself change 
the essential nature of the composition so as to make it a drama.”202 Other 
than the race itself, there was no evidence that the defendants had copied 
any of the fictionalized elements of Seltzer’s rules.203 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that game play 
is a performance, for reasons that are worth examining in detail. In Allen v. 
Academic Games League of America, Inc.,204 the plaintiff, Allen, was the 
author of several academic board games and the organizer of a tournament 
for high school students to play academic games, including his own.205 The 
individual defendants had formerly been associated with Allen but had split 
with him in order to organize their own competing tournament, under the 
  
 199 One court reached the counterintuitive result that playing an arcade game was a public perfor-
mance of the game. See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 
1989). Red Baron was soon overturned by congressional statute. See Computer Software Rental 
Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 803, 104 Stat. 5134, 5135. That measure was tempo-
rary and has since expired, to little fanfare. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8.15[I], at 8-207. As 
the Nimmer treatise notes, the bizarre result of Red Baron was that an arcade video game could not be 
used for its sole purpose without a license directly from the manufacturer. See id. The facts of the case 
may have influenced this result: Red Baron involved grey-market goods. See Red Baron, 883 F.2d at 
277. 
 200 Seltzer distributed a pamphlet in connection with his races that contained a two-and-a-half page 
description of an imaginary race, with passages such as the following: “Here comes an ambitious 
youngster trying to steal a lap on the field. He is challenged by the others who increase their pace and 
make it impossible for him to accomplish his desire. He settles back in his original position, winded and 
flushed with excitement.” Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 624 (S.D. Cal. 1938) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 201 See id. at 623. 
 202 Id. at 630; see also Seltzer v. Corem, 107 F.2d 75, 77 (7th Cir. 1939) (adopting the court’s 
conclusions in Sunbrock). 
 203 Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. at 631. Furthermore, the court expressed doubt about the originality of 
Seltzer’s description of and rules for a roller derby: 
Were plaintiffs’ contention to prevail in this case, might not the author of a copyrighted nov-
el, containing a vivid and colorful description of one of the earlier football games, enjoin any 
future student body from employing the customary devices and patterns of the modern root-
ing section[?] As every enthusiast knows, the waving pom-poms, the quickly shifting color 
patterns, the intermission stunts, and in fact most of the much cherished atmosphere of col-
lege football has been associated with regattas, folk festivals, and outdoor sports since time 
immemorial. And does not the “brek-ek-ek-ex, co-ax, co-ax” of the college yell date back at 
least to the antiphonal chant of Aristophanes’ Frogs? 
Id. 
 204 89 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 205 Id. at 615. 
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name “Academic Games League of America (AGLOA).”206 AGLOA’s 
tournaments featured some of Allen’s games.207 Allen sued, claiming that 
playing his games in AGLOA tournaments constituted infringing public 
performances.208 Allen’s argument was simple: his games were copyrighted; 
the defendants’ tournaments featured contestants playing his games in  
public;209 and § 101 of the Copyright Act defines “perform” as “to recite, 
render, play, dance, or act” a work.210 Playing Allen’s copyrighted work in 
public was therefore an infringement of his rights.211 
Deciding the case on the briefs, the Ninth Circuit rejected Allen’s  
argument.212 The court first noted that the term “play” in § 101 “has  
generally been limited to instances of playing music or records” and that 
courts have not extended the definition to playing games.213 “To do so 
would mean interpreting the Copyright Act in a manner that would allow 
the owner of a copyright in a game to control when and where purchasers of 
games may play the games,”214 the court reasoned, which is of course the 
natural consequence of a public performance right. “[T]his court will not 
place such an undue restraint on consumers.”215 That flat declaration,  
however, is merely a conclusion, not an argument. In support of it, the court 
offered only this: “Whether privately in one’s home or publicly in a park, it 
is understood that games are meant to be ‘played.’”216 
The meaning of this Delphic pronouncement is unclear.217 Movies and 
CDs are meant to be played as well, but the owners of the copyrights in 
  
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 615-16.  
 209 Id. at 616.  
 210 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 211 See Allen, 89 F.3d at 616. 
 212 See id. The court noted an applicable fair use defense, but declined to rule solely on that basis. 
See id. at 617-18. AGLOA was a non-profit corporation, and the tournaments were held “for encourag-
ing education among young students.” Id. at 615, 617. That alone would not establish fair use, but the 
court did not examine the argument in detail. See id. at 617. But see 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, 
§ 8.14[B][2], at 8-190.1 n.34.4 (suggesting that the fair use argument was likely valid). 
 213 Allen, 89 F.3d at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. The Nimmer treatise criticizes the court for construing the meaning of “play.” See 
2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8.14[B][2], at 8-190.1 n.34.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although the defendants apparently did not raise the argument, they had an excellent defense to any 
claim that they were performing a copyrighted literary work: § 110 of the Copyright Act permits “per-
formance of a nondramatic literary . . . work . . . without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial 
advantage and without payment of any fee or other compensation for the performance to any of its 
performers, promoters, or organizers, if . . . there is no direct or indirect admission charge.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 110(4) (2006). However, Allen could have revoked their ability to host future tournaments featuring 
his games on written notice. See id. § 110(4)(B).  
 216 Allen, 89 F.3d at 616. 
 217 David Nimmer has suggested that the court was making an implied license argument: sale of a 
copyrighted board game may be thought to include an implied license to play it in public. See 2 NIMMER 
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those have public performance rights. Yet the court’s statement appears to 
capture an ineffable truth about games. Although it is no linguistic accident 
that the noun “play” means a dramatic work and that the verb “to play” can 
either mean to perform a song, operate an entertainment device, or engage 
in a fun activity, there is a crucial difference between these four meanings. 
Playing a game is the way that the game is experienced. Watching a game 
or reading the rules, while possibly entertaining activities, are not the same 
as playing a game. Games are meant to be played in the same way that 
movies are meant to be watched and books are meant to be read. None of 
those things—playing a game, watching a movie, or reading a book—are 
performances. 
“Playing” a movie or CD in public, or performing a play, is an act of 
communication. The operator or performers are engaged in an activity that 
is intended to transmit the expression in the work to third parties. When a 
movie or CD or play is performed in violation of the owner’s rights, it is not 
the person apprehending the work—the viewer or listener—who is liable 
for infringement, but rather the person communicating the work—the  
theater owner or acting company. That is because the rights of public  
distribution, performance, and display regulate only the transmission of 
works from one person to another, and not the experience of the work itself. 
Games are meant to be played, and playing one does not violate any of the 
rights of a game’s copyright owner. 
This feature of copyright law is another example of what Professor 
Timothy Wu has called copyright’s little-recognized “communications  
policy.”218 The policy outlined here, however, goes well beyond that  
  
& NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8.14[B][1], at 8-190.1 n.34.4. But there are two problems with this argument 
as a rule for games generally. First, not every game designer might reasonably expect that his or her 
games will be publicly performed, such that failure to disclaim a license necessarily implies it. That is, 
not all games are typically played in tournaments. See Allen, 89 F.3d at 615 (stating that Allen con-
ducted such tournaments himself). Second, an implied license can typically be defeated by making the 
limitation express. But see Diamond v. Am-Law Publ’g Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(finding that terms attached to a letter to the editor were ineffective). 
Another alternative, suggested by a district court in rejecting an argument that playing a video 
game in a cyber-cafe was not a public performance, is that Allen held that “whether the performance is 
fee-based is an important factor in determining whether the performance is public.” Valve Corp. v. 
Sierra Entm’t Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1097 (W.D. Wash. 2004). This seems to be a strained reading 
of Allen, however, which appears to have held that game play is not a performance of any kind, no 
matter where it occurs. Furthermore, even if the Allen court did attempt to draw a distinction between 
fee-based performances and other performances, it is an unconvincing one. Absent a fair use defense or 
the exclusions in 17 U.S.C. § 110, a performance of a work “at a place open to the public or at any place 
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances 
is gathered” infringes whether or not a fee is charged for admission. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining what 
it means to perform a work “publicly”). A vague sense of camaraderie will not ordinarily convert stran-
gers into the “normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances.” 
 218 See Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 (2004) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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delineated by Wu. Wu argues that while the core of copyright law addresses 
the incentives due to creators, the variegated exceptions and additions to the 
basic provisions of copyright law can only be explained as a form of 
“communications policy”—regulation of “competition among rival  
disseminators.”219 Wu argues that the recent expansion of this policy 
beyond disseminators to end-users is a particularly troubling develop-
ment.220 But if the argument of this Article is correct, a significant portion 
of the core of copyright law is based on a type of “communications  
policy”—policy governing when expression may be communicated to  
others and under what terms.221 One of those terms is that the private  
experience of copyrighted works is beyond the scope of the owner’s rights. 
There is expression in games, music, and plays, and all three media 
communicate that expression to their intended audiences. The difference 
between the three, however, is the connection between the expression that 
is contained, or “fixed,”222 in the work and the intellectual experience of the 
audience. Music and plays encode and transmit a protected aesthetic or  
intellectual experience from author to audience. Games, however, do not 
transmit the game-playing experience; they merely create the conditions for 
it to occur. The game-playing experience arises out of the interaction  
between the players and the game. That experience is therefore not  
transmitted through the medium of the game materials; it emerges in game 
play. In other words, while the fixed expression in sheet music and scripts 
for plays “contains” the music or the play, the fixed expression in a game—
the rules, the board, etc.—allows too much flexibility to actually “contain” 
any particular instance of a game. 
This is true even though sheet music, scripts, and other works allow 
considerable flexibility in performance, as should be apparent to anyone 
who has ever seen different productions of Hamlet or compared Leonard 
Bernstein’s dirge-like version of “Lacrimosa” from Mozart’s “Requiem” to 
the faster pacing of other versions. Performers add their own contributions 
to a work during performance such that each performance of a work is 
somewhat different. Musicians may choose the tempo or add emphasis; 
actors supplement the dialog with delivery, facial expressions, and body 
  
 219 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 220 See id. at 356-57. Similarly, Julie E. Cohen has argued that copyright law has a fast-
disappearing public/private distinction. See Julie E. Cohen, Comment: Copyright's Public-Private Dis-
tinction, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 963-64 (2005). This includes, among other things, a “right to 
read anonymously.” See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 982 (1996). The argument here is somewhat 
different. It is not that the acts in private are insulated from copyright liability, or that users have any 
right to prohibit copyright owners from learning their identities, but rather that the scope of copyright 
does not reach the mental apprehension of a work, whether that occurs publicly or privately. 
 221 Only the reproduction right and the derivative works right lack explicit restriction to the public 
sphere. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 222 See id. § 101 (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining when a work is “fixed”). 
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language. Variations in performance are not the only potential source of 
variation in the experience of a work. The individual members of the  
audience may approach a given work differently, deriving their own  
meaning from the expression, such that each person’s experience of the 
work is slightly different. 
Nevertheless, the aesthetic or intellectual experience in each instance 
is substantially similar; Bernstein’s “Lacrimosa” is still “Lacrimosa,” and 
most listeners will identify it as such. The reason is that the contributions of 
performers and audience members to the experience are tightly constrained 
by the expression that is fixed in the work itself. A work of authorship  
conveys specific information in a set pattern or sequence. For example, a 
musical work sets out the notes to be played in a certain order.  
“Lacrimosa,” for example, conveys the melody in the soprano part through 
the notes “A,” “F,” “D,” “D,” “C#,” and every performance of it will  
contain something similar. 
Games are different. The core of a particular instance of a game is 
composed of the moves or plays that the players make on that occasion. But 
those moves or plays vary considerably from one game to the next,  
depending on such factors as player strategies and random events. One 
game of chess is not like another game of chess.223 The sequence of events 
can vary considerably. A chess player may choose any of twenty different 
initial moves, leading to hundreds of possible openings and nearly an  
infinite number of possible games. The only similarity in the game creator’s 
expression between two game sessions is in the elements of the game that 
were used—the rules sheet, the game board, the pieces, or the cards. In  
other words, the game’s constituent elements may be copyrightable, but the 
game itself is not. 
The most evident difference between games, music, and plays is in 
how they are typically communicated to the audience. Music and plays are 
normally communications through the “players” to an audience of other 
people. There are exceptions, of course; someone may purchase sheet music 
purely to play at home. In that case, it would be a private performance and 
beyond the scope of the copyright.224 But the basis for the protection of  
music and plays—as well as books, films, art, and all the rest—is that the 
author is given the exclusive right to communicate those expressions to the 
public, through reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, public  
performance, and public display. With games, the communication of the 
  
 223 For example, Spassky-Fischer game 3 of the 1972 World Chess Championship was a far differ-
ent game than Spassky-Fischer game 13. Intriguingly, some chess players have attempted to claim 
copyright in their games. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:20, at 4-77 (2010). Players 
do not own any copyright in their games in play either. See infra note 225. 
 224 Alternatively, a musical performance might be for the purposes of a competition in which the 
primary purpose of the performance is to judge the performer’s skill, rather than appreciate the aesthetic 
qualities of the work performed. But the point here is that these are atypical examples. 
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game designer’s expression, in the rules and game equipment, largely ends 
with the players, who do not convey the game designer’s expression  
further. The moves that the players make within the constraints of the game 
are not typically designed to communicate with an audience, but rather to 
achieve a goal: winning the game.225 That is, game play is not expressive.226 
A game session is therefore not a “performance” of the expression in the 
game, public or private; it is outside the scope of copyright altogether. That 
is the purpose of the black-letter rule. 
There is a deeper point here, one that clarifies the distinction between 
copyrightable material and uncopyrightable systems or processes. Judges 
and scholars alike have drawn that line by distinguishing between  
expression that informs or entertains and functional expression.227 But  
informing or entertaining is itself a function, and a work or a machine that 
has those functions may still be an uncopyrightable system or process. For 
example, a software DVD player contains a number of uncopyrightable 
processes, even though the purpose of that player, and the ultimate purpose 
of the processes, is to entertain. Other systems, such as the code of  
procedures in American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n or the 
blank form in Kregos v. Associated Press,228 have the purpose of informing. 
Drawing the line between informational and non-informational functions 
allows back into copyright a large amount of material that was previously 
excluded. 
The problem arises from looking at works in the abstract, as either 
functional or expressive outside of any context of use. Copyrighted works 
are communications. The key element that is missing from these analyses is 
therefore to look at both ends of the communication and to determine 
whether the expression that is transmitted from author to user is the primary 
source of meaning. In other words, is the material in question directly 
communicating some message to the user? Or is it being used  
instrumentally to perform some other task? Systems or procedures for 
which the user himself supplies the critical informational or creative inputs 
  
 225 This is why players do not have a copyright in the game-in-play, either—like sports athletes, 
their activity does not bear meaning; it is engaged in primarily to win the game, not to impart informa-
tion or aesthetic values to the audience. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (finding sports games not copyrightable). 
 226 Again, counterexamples are possible. A game session might be part of an avant-garde artistic 
performance. See, e.g., Matthew Mirapaul, Take That, Monica! Kapow, Chandler!, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 3, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/03/arts/design/03MATT.html (performance of 
“Quake/Friends”). But such endeavors are an atypical use of a game. 
 227 See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 193, at 524; Weinreb, supra note 125, at 1204-05; see also 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, § 2.3.1.1, at 2:30 (including as uncopyrightable ideas “the principle or 
method of operation that makes a work useful if it is a functional work”). Baker v. Selden and its proge-
ny generally drew a line between expression that teaches an art and expression that is used in the art 
itself. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). 
 228 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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are uncopyrightable—for example, games, sports,229 systems of notation, 
blank forms, or codes of dental procedures, the purpose and principal use of 
which is merely to translate dental procedures into five-digit codes.230 
CONCLUSION 
Games are uncopyrightable systems. The age-old doctrinal rule against 
the copyrightability of games is not an anachronism; it is deeply embedded 
in the structure of copyright law. Copyright excludes systems where the 
informational or entertainment value that is extracted from the work is  
supplied by the users, not the author. Games, like other systems, establish 
the arena for use—the “magic circle”—but the experience of play is  
supplied by the players, not the game designer. Copyright has long  
excluded such “state machines” from its protection. It is only relatively 
recently, in the confusion wrought by software and widespread litigation 
over commercial guides, that this doctrine has come under significant  
scrutiny. 
The deep roots of the rule against the copyrightability of games have 
important consequences not just for games, but for all systems. For games, 
in particular video games, it means that any simple analogy between games 
and other media should be rejected. Even video games, despite being  
comprised of software, audiovisual elements, plots, graphics, and  
characters, nevertheless have an uncopyrightable core: the actual play of the 
game. For systems, the rule against the copyrightability of games  
demonstrates why systems are generally uncopyrightable and why that term 
has special significance. The term is not merely a synonym for “idea,” or 
“process.” Systems are shells into which users pour meaning. While they 
may contain expression themselves, that expression is there merely to  
facilitate the meaning added by the user. Copyright properly excludes them. 
 
  
 229 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 846 (“Sports events are not ‘authored’ in any common 
sense of the word.”). 
 230 See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 977 (7th Cir. 1997). Under 
this analysis, American Dental Ass’n and Kregos were wrongly decided. 
